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                JUDGING RISK 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Risk assessment plays an increasingly pervasive role in criminal justice 
in the United States at all stages of the process—from policing, to pre-
trial, sentencing, corrections, and parole. As efforts to reduce mass 
incarceration have led to adoption of risk-assessment tools, critics have 
begun to ask whether various instruments in use are valid and whether 
they might reinforce rather than reduce bias in the criminal justice 
system.  Such work has largely neglected how decisionmakers use risk 
assessment in practice.  In this Article, we explore the judging of risk 
assessment. We study why decisionmakers so often fail to consistently 
use quantitative risk assessment tools.   
 
We present the results of a novel set of studies of both judicial 
decisionmaking and attitudes towards risk assessment.  We studied 
Virginia because it was the first state to incorporate risk assessment in 
sentencing guidelines.  Virginia has been hailed as a national model for 
doing so.  In analyzing sentencing data in Virginia, we find that judicial 
use of risk assessment is highly variable.   Second, in the first 
comprehensive survey of its kind, we find judicial attitudes towards risk 
assessment in sentencing practice quite divided.  Even if, in theory, an 
instrument can better sort offenders in less need of jail or prison, in 
practice, decisionmakers may not use it as intended.   
 
Still more fundamentally, in criminal justice, unlike in other areas of 
the law, one typically does not have detailed regulations concerning the 
use of risk assessment, specifying the content of assessment criteria, the 
peer review process, and standards for judicial review.  We make 
recommendations for how to better convey risk assessment information 
to judges and other decisionmakers, but also how to structure that 
decisionmaking based on common assumptions and goals.  We argue 
that judges and lawmakers must revisit the use of risk assessment in 
practice.  We conclude by setting out a roadmap for use of risk 
information in criminal justice.  Unless judges and lawmakers regulate 
the judging of risk assessment, the risk revolution in criminal justice 
will not succeed in addressing mass-incarceration. 
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JUDGING RISK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 America is experiencing a risk assessment revolution in criminal justice.  The 
role of risk assessment is increasingly prominent at all stages of the criminal justice 
system, including policing, pretrial detention, sentencing, corrections, and parole.1  
The assessment of offender risk was a central feature of criminal sentencing prior to 
the mid-1970s, when jurisdictions throughout the United States began rejecting 
forward-looking risk assessment in favor of backward-looking retributive concerns.  
As jurisdictions have reconsidered use of incarceration, risk assessment has returned 
in new and more sophisticated ways.2  Efforts to reduce “mass incarceration” have 
led to the adoption of risk assessment tools as an alternative to money bail, as a way 
to determine the length of incarceration and the intensity of probation or parole 
supervision, and to decide which mentally ill or substance abusing offenders might 
safely be diverted to treatment in the community.  In its 2017 revision, the Model 
Penal Code prominently endorsed consideration of risk.3  As risk-based approaches 
have multiplied, critics have asked whether certain risk instruments are predictively 
valid and whether they might reinforce rather than reduce bias, including racial bias, 
in criminal justice outcomes.4  We argue here that the discussion about the role of 
risk assessment has neglected a separate and fundamental question: how do judges 
and other decisionmakers use risk assessment in practice? 
 That question now has a constitutional dimension.  The Fifth Circuit recently 
affirmed a federal judge’s order that the cash bail system in Harris County, Texas, 
violates the due process clause because it adopted a “flawed procedural framework,” 
                                               
1 See, e.g. Sonja B. Starr, The Risk Assessment Era: An Overdue Debate, 27 FED. SENT. REP. 205, 205 
(2015) (“we are already in the risk assessment era”); Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of 
Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 564–67 (2015) (critiquing use of risk 
assessment in parole and probation); John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in 
Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 493–94 (2016) (describing use of risk 
assessment in sentencing); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014) (critiquing use of risk assessment at 
sentencing); Sandra G. Mayson, Bail Reform and Restraint for Dangerousness: Are Defendants a 
Special Case?, 127 YALE L.J. (2017) (describing use of risk assessment in bail).  In addition, risk 
assessments are used in civil context, such as civil commitment to a mental hospital.  For an excellent 
overview, see Jay P. Singh, Stal Bjorkly & Seena Fazel, eds., International Perspectives on Violence 
Risk Assessment 9-10 (2018). 
2 Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk Assessment in Criminal 
Justice, 1 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 397 (2005).  
3 Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 6B.09(3) (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft, approved May 24, 
2017). 
4 For example, then-Attorney General Eric Holder questioned the use of risk assessment, stating: 
“Using group data to make an individualized determination, I think, can result in fundamental 
unfairness.” Holder: Big Data is Leading to ‘Fundamental Unfairness’ in Drug Sentencing, PBS News 
Hour, July 31, 2014. For additional scholarly critics, see Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing, supra note 
1; Klingele, supra note 1; see also infra Part I.A. 
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in which bail decisions by individual judges were arbitrary in practice.5  Judges 
departed from release recommendations by pre-trial services as much as 66% of the 
time.6  The Fifth Circuit found a state-protected liberty interest in pretrial release 
and found that the process violated due process rights of persons facing trial, 
although also noting that judges need not be required to provide written decisions 
explaining their reasons for denying release or bail.7  Additional litigation is pending 
in other Circuits.8  The implications of this due process analysis for settings in which 
judges are informed by quantitative risk assessment methods have not been fully 
explored.  Moreover, the remedy, in rejecting a bail schedule that relied on individual 
ability to pay, and requiring individualized, case-specific findings, might not 
sufficiently eliminate troubling race and income-based disparities.  Indeed, the Fifth 
Circuit ruling could lead to greater disparities and worse outcomes.  We develop here 
how uneven implementation of risk assessment by judges and other decisionmakers 
may raise the same problems found unconstitutional in Harris County.  Still more 
fundamentally, in criminal justice, unlike in other areas of the law, one typically does 
not have detailed regulations concerning the use of risk assessment, specifying 
assessment criteria, the peer review process, and judicial review.9  A model for the 
regulation of criminal justice risk assessment is urgently needed. 
 In this Article, we examine the judging and regulation of risk assessment.  We 
present empirical evidence on how judges actually use (and fail to use) such 
instruments.  Very little information has been available about the judicial use of these 
risk assessments.10  The focus has been on the validity of the risk assessment 
instruments themselves, but not on how well they are actually used in practice.11  To 
address this question, we conducted a set of studies of judicial decisionmaking in 
                                               
5 O’Donnell v. Harris County, Texas, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018); affirming, reversing and modifying 
in part, O’Donnell v. Harris County, Texas, 882 F.3d 528, 536 (5th Cir. 2018).  
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 160 (“We decline to hold that the Constitution requires the County to produce 50,000 written 
opinions per year to satisfy due process.”).  The Court also relied on empirical analysis of outcomes in 
the county.  Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 
STAN. L. REV. 711, 786–87 (2017). 
8 Describing the role of the American Bar Association in the Fifth Circuit as well as pending Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuit litigation, see Lorelei Laird, ABA Files Amicus Brief Challenging Money Bail System 
As House of Delegates Considers Resolution, Aug. 10, 2017, 
at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_amicus_brief_money_bail_5th_circuit.  
9 For example, the federal Regulatory Improvement Act specifies the use of risk assessment for any 
“major rule” by a federal agency. Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998, S. 981, 105th Cong., § 623(a)(1) 
(1998). 
10 One excellent Article has carefully examined judicial variation and use of the pre-trial risk 
assessment instruments used in recent years in Kentucky.  See Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk 
Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3016088.  We are aware of no studies examining 
risk assessment at sentencing.  We discuss one survey of judicial opinion and media accounts of judicial 
practices in local jurisdictions infra Part III. 
11 See, e.g. Richard Berk, An Impact Assessment of Machine Learning Risk Forecasts on Parole Board 
Decisions and Recidivism, 13 J. EXP. CRIMINOL. 193, 193 (2017) (noting we have “scant information 
about how actuarial risk assessments have affected practices and outcomes”). 
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Virginia.  We selected Virginia because it is considered by many to be a national mode 
for the way in which it has regulated risk assessment.  Virginia was the first state to 
formally incorporate risk assessment into its sentencing guidelines, to permit 
alternative sentences for lower risk offenders.  Second, we selected Virginia because 
risk assessment is used at sentencing (in addition to its use in settings such as bail, 
in which decisionmaking can be rapid and based on little deliberation.)   
We conclude, based on the Virginia data analyzed, that there is a need for new 
policy solutions.  Judges failed to give alternative sentences to many thousands of 
eligible non-violent offenders, and when they did give alternative sentences, they did 
not order that offenders be released with or without community supervision, but 
instead typically ordered that time in time in state prison be replaced by time in a 
local jail. We also observe that in plea bargaining, prosecutors often did not consider 
risk assessment information in negotiations.  When surveying Virginia Circuit Court 
judges, we learned that a sizable minority of judges had great discomfort with the 
goals and the use of risk assessment at sentencing, although their opinions were quite 
divided.  Some judges described how they embraced risk assessment when used to 
reduce sentences for low-risk offenders.  Others described risk assessment as just 
“another tool that aids but does not supplant judicial judgment.”  Still others express 
extreme distaste for risk assessment; for example: “Frankly, I pay very little attention 
to the [risk assessment] worksheets… I also don’t go to psychics.” That some judges 
were not fully cognizant of the availability of risk assessment in sentencing was also 
unsurprising, given the almost complete lack of judicial training on the subject.12  
These studies of judicial practice and opinion concerning risk assessment 
produced several important insights into how to better institutionalize use of risk 
assessment.  Training and better-informed decisionmaking is needed. To change 
behavior, it is not enough to adopt a technical tool; attitudes towards the use 
decisionmaking need to change.  Nor is the problem of how to best implement 
generalized data to inform individual decisionmaking unique to the risk assessment 
setting.13  We describe how much can be learned from other settings in which well-
regulated and structured decisionmaking models have been used.  Just as judicial 
sentencing guidelines have been criticized not just for their content but based on how 
judges applied them and the assumptions they embody,14 we must look carefully at 
how judges apply risk assessment instruments in their courtrooms.  Behavioral 
research on how decisionmakers make use of quantitative information can help to 
inform this task.  A new approach is needed that takes account of interface between 
general quantitative risk information and the officials, such as judges, prosecutors, 
                                               
12 See infra Part II.C. 
13 See, e.g.  David L. Faigman, John Monahan, and Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i) 
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (2014). 
14 See, e.g. Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgement, The Atlantic, Feb. 25, 2016 
(describing a decades-long history of judicial criticism); José A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Dismal Failure, New York Law Journal, February 11, 1992; see generally Kate Stith and José A. 
Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998). 
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and probation officers, who take that information into account in decisionmaking.  
That interface must be evidence-informed and based on common goals.   
Many states have made the use of these instruments advisory rather than 
presumptive or mandatory, and as a result, the discretion of the decisionmaker plays 
an important role.15  States have already had to revisit the use of risk assessment 
because of the ways in which decisionmakers used them, or do not use them, and 
localities have similarly begun to question how these systems are being used, 
including due to legal challenges.16  Even if in theory, a risk assessment instrument 
could better sort offenders more and less in need of correctional supervision, in 
practice, decisionmakers may not use instruments as intended.  After all, part of the 
move to adopt risk instruments is dissatisfaction with traditional exercise of 
discretion.17  In this Article, we provide a roadmap for: (1) presenting risk information 
in a more comprehensible way to decisionmakers; (2) structuring decisionmaking to 
better make use of that information; and (3) accompanying these reforms with 
ongoing monitoring, through judicial review and open peer review, of data to assess 
on-the-ground use of risk assessment.  
 The need to get risk assessment right has never been more pressing.  Every 
year, upwards of ten million people are arrested in the United States.  Judges must 
then decide whether to jail people while pending trial.  Every year, millions of people 
are convicted in the United States.  Incarceration, which reached record levels, with 
increased prison populations in every year from 1970 to 2007, began to modestly 
decline starting in 2008, but so far the effect has been to halt growth rather than to 
substantially reduce the prison population.18 Efforts to reduce reliance on 
incarceration have been bipartisan, and they have largely focused on efforts to divert 
offenders, including less risky offenders, from jail and prison.19  That makes the task 
of accurately identifying such offenders all the more important. At the same time, 
mounting academic and public criticism has focused on concerns with lack of 
transparency and potential bias in the design of risk instruments.20  Those concerns 
should extend to how officials use risk assessment in practice.   
                                               
15 For a piece pointing out that abolition of parole meant “transferring risk discretion” to judges, but 
not asking how well-informed the use is of that discretion, see Kevin R. Reitz, “Risk Discretion” at 
Sentencing, 30 FED. SENT’G. REP. 70 (2017).  
16 For a description of a review of over 1,500 cases in Chicago in which judges “routinely” or 85% of the 
time made bail decisions contrary to a new risk instrument, see Frank Main, Cook County Judges Not 
Following Bail Recommendations: Study, Chicago Sun-Times, July 3, 2016. 
17 See, e.g. Crystal S. Yang, Toward and Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399 (2017). 
18  Lauren E. Glaze & Danielle Kaeble, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Correctional Populations in the 
United States, 2013, at 2 (2014), at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf. 
19 Right on Crime, http://www.rightoncrime.com; Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Prison Reform: A Smart 
Way for States to Save Money and Lives, Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 2011. 
20 Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017); Julia Angwin et al., 
Machine Bias, Propublica (May 23, 2016), at https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing; Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., The New Science of Sentencing, 
Marshall Project (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new- science-of-
sentencing.  
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In Part I of this Article, we present an overview describing the growing use of 
risk assessment instruments in criminal justice, including through the development 
of empirically validated quantitative tools to assess risk. We explain what risk 
assessment is, how it can be used and in what criminal contexts, the types of risk 
instruments used, and we summarize the types of approaches adopted in recent 
years.  Second, we provide an overview of both the reasons why risk assessment has 
become attractive to so many lawmakers and policymakers in recent years and the 
concerns critics have raised about the design of those instruments.  Third, we describe 
a wide variety of risk assessment tools in use, ranging in complexity from simple 
checklists or scorecards to algorithms.  In the pre-trial context, New Jersey and 
Kentucky, for example, along with many local jurisdictions, use the Public Safety 
Assessment (PSA) developed by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation.21 State 
Supreme Courts, such as the Indiana Supreme Court, the Kentucky Supreme Court, 
the Nebraska Judicial Council and the New Jersey Supreme Court have ordered 
studies or sweeping changes.22  States are using risk-based instruments to assess 
conditions of confinement as well.23 
In Part II of this Article, we present the results of a study of the use of non-
violent risk assessment in Virginia.  We focus on Virginia, because, in the words of 
the Model Penal Code: “On risk assessment as a prison-diversion tool, Virginia has 
been the leading innovator among American states.”24  In 2002, at request of the 
legislature, the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission adopted a risk-based 
instrument for releasing non-violent offenders as an alternative to prison.25  We 
examine how judges have applied this instrument.  It is a fairly brief worksheet 
typically filled out by a probation officer.  It is incorporated by statute into the 
Virginia sentencing guidelines.  We describe our findings: of the entire population of 
8,443 offenders who qualify for the use of the non-violent risk assessment (NVRA), 
3,396 or 40.2% scored in the category of low risk offenders, and were therefore eligible 
for an alternative sentence. Of those, 42.2% (1,433 people) did in fact receive an 
alternative sentence.  We describe how most of those alternative sentences involved 
                                               
21 See Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, at http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf (“The PSA was created using a database of over 
1.5 million cases drawn from more than 300 U.S. jurisdictions. We analyzed the data to identify the 
factors that are the best predictors of whether a defendant will commit a new crime, commit a new 
violent crime, or fail to return to court.”). 
22 IL Staff, Supreme Court Issues Order on Pretrial Release, Indiana Lawyer, Dec. 23, 2014, at 
http://www.theindianalawyer.com/supreme-court-issues-order-on-
pretrialrelease/PARAMS/article/35974; Pretrial Release Outcomes Studied by Nevada Judiciary, 
October 2, 2015, at 
http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/News/Pretrial_Release_Outcomes_Studied_by_Nevada_Judiciary/; for a 
discussion of Kentucky Supreme Court orders, see infra Part III.A.   
23 See generally, FT. Cullen, A.J. Myer, and E.J. Latessa, Eight Lessons from Moneyball: The High Cost 
of Ignoring Evidence-Based Corrections, 4 Victims and Offenders 97 (2009). 
24 Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 6B.09(3) (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Final Draft, May 24, 2017). 
25 Brian J. Ostrom et al., Offender Risk Assessment in Virginia: A Three-Stage Evaluation (2002); 
Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, 2010 Annual Report 38-41 (2011).  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jail time and not release to the community.  We observed extremely wide variation 
between both individual judges and entire judicial circuits in their use of the NVRA.   
Second, we surveyed judges in Virginia and found highly divergent attitudes 
towards the NVRA. There has been very little information available about how judges 
view the increasing use of risk assessment in the U.S.  We were able to obtain the 
participation of 52.8 percent of all 161 Circuit Judges in Virginia (85 judges).  We 
found that a strong majority of judges endorse the principle that sentencing eligible 
offenders should include consideration of recidivism risk. However, a strong majority 
also reported that in their jurisdictions, they lack adequate alternatives to 
imprisonment.  We found most judges opposed any policy requiring them to provide 
a written reason for declining to impose alternative interventions on low risk 
offenders.  We then develop implications of these findings for improving the use of 
risk assessment in criminal cases. 
In Part III, we turn to the experience with risk assessment in other states.  In 
several jurisdictions, including the city of Chicago, and the state of Kentucky, there 
is evidence regarding how judges have used risk assessment pretrial.  In other 
jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania, there is evidence regarding use of risk 
assessment at parole.  That evidence similarly suggests the challenge of integrating 
risk assessment into judicial and other official decisionmaking.   
 In Part IV, we develop a model for how to better regulate and integrate risk 
assessment into criminal justice decisionmaking.  First, we draw from administrative 
procedures used in other fields, in which risk management is regulated, using 
accepted criteria, with a public approval process, validation, and ongoing review.  
Second, we draw from research on decisionmaking regarding risk and communication 
of risk.  We suggest that risk assessment information should be better explained, so 
that the probabilities relied on are concrete and understandable in the practical 
context in which judges or other officials in the criminal justice system work.  Second, 
we discuss solutions aimed at better structuring the manner in which risk 
information is incorporated into decisions.  Third, we recommend the need for ongoing 
validation not just of risk assessment instruments, but of their use in practice by the 
relevant decisionmakers.  Risk assessment has a behavioral component as 
administered.  The problem of judicial use of risk assessment is part of a larger 
challenge: encouraging empirically sound official decisionmaking.  
Getting criminal justice risk assessment right is crucial. To successfully reduce 
incarceration, these instruments need to be designed correctly, but they also need to 
be used correctly.  Decisionmakers like judges have been accustomed to making 
decisions without the benefit of quantitative information.  To change decisionmaking, 
we need to address both policy, the structure of decisionmaking, and training.  
Coherent regulation is needed, and not just the adoption of a risk assessment 
instrument.  We hope that our recommendations will be considered as part of 
conversations on how to use risk assessment to improve outcomes at each stage of the 
criminal justice system. 
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I. THE SECOND COMING OF RISK ASSESSMENT IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
 There has been a movement across many fields of regulation and business to 
use risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis tools to improve rules and outcomes.26  
Those methods can both involve efforts to measure the frequency and likelihood of 
adverse outcomes, but also their severity or cost.27  Such methods are an everyday 
aspect of management, and they are integral to entire fields like insurance and 
finance. They have been widely incorporated into federal administrative 
policymaking—but they have had an uneven history in criminal justice.   
Beginning in the early 20th Century, risk assessment tools were adopted in 
criminal justice in the United States.  In the 1970s, those experiments with the use 
of quantitative tools to evaluate criminal cases were largely neglected, as criminal 
justice focused more on retributive approaches to punishment.  The largely 
retributive approach has changed in the past decade and a half—policymakers turned 
back towards rehabilitation—and more quantitative research on recidivism began to 
inform policy.28  We are in the midst of a risk assessment revolution in criminal 
justice.  That said, in criminal justice, unlike in other fields, one typically does not 
have regulations concerning the use of risk assessment.  Instead, the process has 
often been ad hoc and involves conveying risk information to judges and other 
decisionmakers, who retain their traditional discretion.  In the sections that follow, 
we describe: (1) the traditional use of risk assessment in criminal justice; (2) the 
recent rise in the use of more empirically-informed risk assessment instruments in a 
variety of criminal justice settings; and (3) the criticism of the rising reliance on risk 
assessment in criminal justice. 
 
A.  The Traditional Use of Risk Assessment  
 
 The most widely used definition of risk assessment describes it as “the process 
of using risk factors to estimate the likelihood (i.e., probability) of an outcome 
occurring in a population.”29 “Risk factors” are simply variables that (1) statistically 
correlate with recidivism, and (2) precede recidivism in time. In the case of pretrial 
decisionmaking, the relevant population consists in persons facing criminal charges. 
In the case of sentencing, the relevant population consists in convicted offenders.   
In the area of policing, police officers have long made predictions regarding 
neighborhoods and individuals that may be more likely to engage in criminal activity, 
and agencies can deploy resources based on those assessments of risk.  Increasingly, 
                                               
26 See, e.g. Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Risk and the Environment: 
Improving Regulatory Decision Making (1993). 
27 Fred Anderson et al, Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 89 (2000).  
28 See Simon, supra note 1.  
29 Helena Kraemer et al., Coming to Terms with the Terms of Risk, 54 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 340 (1997). 
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police departments have used data analysis to inform this predictive decisionmaking, 
including based on quantitative instruments.30   
In the area of pretrial detention, traditionally the focus in the U.S. was to 
impose bail to prevent flight and ensure that the defendant was present in court.  
Beginning in the 1970s, the focus increased on preventing the commission of 
additional crimes.31  The 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act and state laws adopted in 
almost every state changed that to focus on the risk assessment of new crime, but 
they asked judges to predict new crime without the benefit of empirical evidence.32  
The laws typically defined “dangerousness” extremely broadly, giving judges 
substantial discretion to consider defendants dangerous, or not defining danger at 
all.33 Empirical work has examined variability between judges in making bail 
decisions and has found judges highly variable.34   
 At sentencing, judicial discretion involving an assessment of the likelihood of 
recidivism was once a feature of indeterminate sentencing. Assessment of risk was 
shared; parole officials would later make an assessment whether a sentence should 
be reduced for an inmate, so that the judge’s assessment was not the final word. As 
indeterminate sentencing gave way to determinate sentencing and sentencing 
guidelines, the obligation fell increasingly (and largely solely) on the judge to fix 
sentences.  At the same time, risk assessment began to disappear from the practice 
of sentencing, both because there was no longer the ability to conduct such 
assessments to grant parole, and because judges were tasked with assigning 
backward-looking retributive sentences and not forward-looking sentences based on 
risk of future crime.35  In recent years this has changed, as the next section describes. 
 
B.  The Rise of Modern Risk Assessment 
 
                                               
30 See, e.g. Mara Hvistendahl, Can ‘Predictive Policing’ Prevent Crime Before it Happens?, Science, 
Sept. 28, 2016; David Robinson and Logan Koepke, Stuck in a Pattern: Early Evidence on Predictive 
Policing and Civil Rights (2016).  For an overview of predictive policing methods and research, see 
Walter Perry et al, Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations, 
RAND (2013).  
31 Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1351 
(2014) (“[h]istorically, the U.S. system of bail and associated pretrial detention was employed solely to 
prevent pretrial flight”). 
32 Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 506-7 (2012). 
33 Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventive Detention and the Judicial Prediction of 
Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 422-24 
(1996). 
34 Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. Legal 
Stud. 471, 477-48 (2016); Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects 
Case Outcomes 3 (2017) (working paper), at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2777615. 
35 John Monahan & Jennifer Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk Assessment in Criminal 
Sanctioning, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 158 (2014); Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction 
of Recidivism, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep.  167 (2014); Kirk Heilbrun, Jaymes Fairfax-Columbo, Suraji 
Wagage, and Leah Brogan, Risk Assessment for Future Offending: The Value and Limits of Expert 
Evidence at Sentencing, 53 COURT REVIEW 116 (2017). 
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Risk assessments are now commonplace at each stage of the criminal process, 
from police investigations, pre-trial settings, sentencing, corrections, and during 
parole, community supervision, as well as in specialized courts such as juvenile or 
mental health courts.  Risk assessment involves, as noted, a process designed to 
predict outcomes.  What outcome is being predicted may depend on the criminal 
setting in which is it being used, and the risk may be defined to include types of 
reoffending, or failure to appear, or substance abuse, or other outcomes.  Risk 
assessment is distinct from risk management: trying to reduce risk through 
supervision or treatment interventions.  Further, it matters not just how risk is 
defined, but for what time frame an outcome is to be predicted.  In general risks 
increase as time frames increase.    
Two types of errors may result, when predictions regarding future individual 
outcomes are based on aggregate information.  The individual, despite the 
assessment that the person is “low” risk, may commit a crime (or fail to appear in 
court, or violate probation, etc.) which would constitute a “false negative” prediction.  
Alternatively, the individual may be assessed as “high” risk, but may not commit the 
relevant type of violation, which would constitute a “false positive” prediction.  False 
negatives may be particularly salient when, despite a prediction to the contrary, an 
offender commits a serious crime.  In contrast, false positives are hard to detect.  If a 
person is erroneously given a lengthy sentence, they cannot easily show that they 
would not have re-offended had they released to the community.  
The types of risk assessment tools vary, depending on their design and the use 
to which they are put.  There are over 400 structured risk assessment instruments 
used around the world.36   Many are largely interchangeable, however, and involve 
the same or similar risk factors.37  The tools available include: Correctional Offender 
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS)38; Correctional 
Assessment and Intervention System (CASI); HCR-2039; Level of Service Inventory-
Revised (LSI-R)40; Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI); 
Minnesota Screening Tool Assessing Recidivism Risk 2.0 (MnSTARR 2.0); Modified 
Wisconsin Risk Assessment (WRN); the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS); the 
federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA)41; the federal Pre-
                                               
36 Nicholas Scurich, An Introduction to the Assessment of Violence Risk, in Singh, Bjorkly & Fazel, 
supra note 2, at 10. 
37 Id. 
38 Northpointe, Practitioner's Guide to COMPAS 1 (2013), at 
http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/FieldGuide2_012813.pdf. 
39 Kevin S. Douglas et al., HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme: Overview and Annotated 
Bibliography 6 (2014), at http:// kdouglas.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/hcr-20-annotated-
bibliographyversion12-january-20142.pdf. 
40 David J. Simourd & P. Bruce Malcolm, Reliability and Validity of the Level of Service Inventory-
Revised Among Federally Incarcerated Sex Offenders, 13 J. Interpersonal Violence 261, 264 (1998). 
41 Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Federal Post Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA): A 
Construction and Validation Study, 10 PSYCHOL. SERVICES 87, 88 (2013). 
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Trial Risk Assessment tool (PTRA)42; and the Static Risk and Offender Needs Guide-
For Recidivism (STRONG-R).  The developers of some of these tools claim not only to 
assess risk, but also to address the rehabilitative “needs” of a person.43 Researchers 
describe how these instruments have evolved from first generation tools, consisting 
in clinical judgment and experience of a decisionmaker, to second-generation tools 
relying on static risk factors (such as criminal history, age, and gender), to third 
generation instruments both looking at risks and needs, and both static and dynamic 
risk factors such as educational status, employment; and fourth generation 
instruments, that provide individualized plans based on assessment of static and 
dynamic factors. A fifth generation of these tools may use machine learning 
techniques to predict recidivism in real-time and using far more complex analysis. 
This “generation” terminology should not necessarily be taken to mean that more 
recent and complex tools necessarily perform better, however.44 
Jurisdictions have widely experimented with using risk instruments pretrial, 
as an alternative (or a supplement) to reliance on cash bail.  Jails have become 
increasingly overburdened in the United States, and they operate at an average of 
90% capacity according to one study, with most serving pretrial detention, although 
only a small percent of those individuals are ultimately convicted.45  In response, 
State Supreme Courts, such as the Indiana Supreme Court, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court, Maryland Supreme Court, Nebraska Judicial Council and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court have ordered studies and changes to pre-trial bail decisionmaking, 
sometimes accompanied by legislation, or changed exclusively through legislation.46  
The pace of change has been rapid.  Every state has adopted new pretrial policies, 
with 500 enactments from 2012 to 2017, and at least 14 states adopting statistical 
risk assessment pre-trial since 2012.47  The American Bar Association recommends 
                                               
42 Timothy P. Cadigan et al., The Re-validation of the Federal Pretrial 
Services Risk Assessment (PTRA), 76 FED. PROBATION 3, 6 (2012). 
43 For an overview of each of these types of risk assessment instruments, see Brian K. Lovins, Edward 
J. Latessa, Teresa May & Jennifer Lux, Validating the Ohio Risk Assessment System Community 
Supervision Tool with a Diverse Sample from Texas, CORRECTIONS 2-3 (2017).  See also Don A. 
Andrews & James Bonta, Risk-Need-Responsivity Model for Offender Assessment and Rehabilitation  
i (2007) (calling such instruments “fourth generation” risk assessment). 
44 J. Stephen Wormith, Automated Offender Risk Assessment: The Next Generation or a Black Hole?, 
16 AM. SOC. CRIMINOL. 281 (2017). 
45 Justice Policy Inst., Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using Money for Bail 3 
(2012). 
46 Ovetta Wiggins & Ann E. Marimow, Maryland's Highest Court Overhauls the State's Cash-Based 
Bail System, Wash. Post (Feb. 7, 2017); Lorelei Laird, Court Systems Rethink the Use of Financial Bail, 
Which Some Say Penalizes the Poor, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2016), 
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/courts_are_rethinking_bail. 
47 National Conference of State Legislatures, Amber Widgery, Trends in Pretrial Release: State 
Legislation 1 (2015); National Conference of State Legislatures, Trends in Pretrial Release: State 
legislation Update (2017), at  
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/html_largeReports/trends_pretrial_release17.htm. 
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the use of pretrial risk assessment, as does the National Association of Counties, the 
Conference of State Court Administrators, and the Conference of Chief Justices.48 
Research has shown that quantitative assessments are more reliable in their 
predictions than those of individual decisionmakers.49  One study found that 42% of 
people would be released pretrial if New York State used an algorithm to make 
decisions concerning pretrial release, rather than use of bail and judicial 
assessments.50 Over two-dozen local jurisdictions and the entire state of New Jersey 
are now using the Public Safety Assessment tool funded by the Laura and John 
Arnold Foundation.51  The tool was based on analysis of 1,500,000 criminal cases in 
300 American jurisdictions.  It is freely available, and it was designed to remove 
factors associated with racial disparities in pretrial detention, such as arrest history, 
and instead relying on factors such as the history of missing court appearances.52 It 
relies on static factors, and not on information gleaned from interviews with a subject, 
including because it is designed to be used early on in the criminal process. 
Other jurisdictions have instead—or in addition—relied on risk assessment to 
divert outright certain classes of offenders from criminal punishment. Virginia was 
an early adopter of that approach.53  As efforts to reduce incarceration have become 
more prominent in the states, almost half of the states now use risk-based 
instruments at sentencing, at least in some types of cases.54  State supreme courts 
have approved the use of risk assessment in sentencing.55  Some states, such as 
Kentucky, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Washington, have required judges to 
consider risk assessment during sentencing.56  A 2007 National Center for State 
                                               
48 American Bar Association, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pretrial Release, Standard 10-1.10; 
National Association of Counties, Legislative Conference 2017, Adopted Interim Policy Resolutions, 
Resolution on Improving Pretrial Justice Process, February 27, 2017; Conference of State Court 
Administrators, 2012-2013 Policy Paper Evidence-Based Pretrial Release, Final Paper. 
49 Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1–2, 141 (2003); 
William M. Grove, et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCH. ASSESS. 
19 (2000). 
50 Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, NBER Working Paper Series 
(February 2017), at https://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/w23180.pdf (“a policy simulation shows 
crime can be reduced by up to 24.8% with no change in jailing rates, or jail populations can be reduced 
by 42.0%with no increase in crime rates.”) 
51  Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf; see also Jon Shuppe, Post Bail, NBC News, Aug. 
22, 2017. 
52 Id. 
53 Brian J. Ostrom et al., Offender Risk Assessment in Virginia: A Three-Stage Evaluation (2002); 
Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, 2010 Annual Report (2011), at 38-41.   
54 J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based Sentencing, 
64 S.M.U. L. REV. 1329, 1399-402 (2011); Monahan &. Skeem, supra note xxx, at 159-60. See Jennifer 
Elek, Roger Warren, and Pamela Casey, Using Risk and Needs Assessment Information at Sentencing 
(2015). 
55 Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 571-73 (Ind. 2010); State v. Gauthier, 939 A.2d 77, 81, 85-86 
(Me. 2007). 
56 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.007; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5120.114; Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 988.19; 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2154.7; Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.500.  
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Courts report encouraged this movement towards empirically-informed sentencing 
approaches.57  As part of the adoption of realignment or Justice Reinvestment 
Initiative legislation, states have increased the use of alternatives to incarceration.  
In California, realignment legislation, requiring reduction of statewide prison 
populations to comply with prison-crowding related court rulings, that led to the use 
of county-specific plans to quite dramatically reduce imprisonment, including 
through the use of a range of different risk-assessment tools.58 
In the juvenile justice system, there has similarly been a shift towards the use 
of risk assessment instruments to identify high risk offenders for greater sanctions 
or for rehabilitation to prevent offending.  While in 1990, only one-third of state 
juvenile justice systems used risk assessment, by 1990, 86% used risk assessments.59  
While more work has been done on validity of risk instruments used to predict 
violence and for adults, a recent systematic review of instruments used in the juvenile 
setting suggested predictive ability on average not different than in adult settings.60 
Still other jurisdictions focus on risk assessment at the probation stage or as a 
means to better utilize community corrections as an alternative to incarceration in 
prison.  The National Institute of Corrections has described how its recommended 
evidence-informed approach uses risk assessments.61  The federal probation office 
and many state probation agencies use risk-based instruments to make probation 
decisions.62  Probation and reentry generally is an area where risk assessment 
similarly plays a far greater role than in the past. 
 
C.  Risk Assessment Debates 
 
Risk assessment in criminal justice has never been more widespread, and 
never more debated among policymakers and scholars. The Model Penal Code, 
revised by the American Law Institute (ALI) in 2017, encourages the use of “actuarial 
instruments or processes to identify offenders who present an unusually low risk to 
                                               
57 Roger K. Warren, Nat’l Ctr. For State Courts, Evidence-Based Practice to Reduce Recidivism: 
Implications For State Judiciaries (2007), at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/023358.pdf; Pamela M. 
Casey et al., Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Using Offender Risk and Needs Assessment Information at 
Sentencing (2011).  
58 Susan Turner & Julie Gerlinger, Risk Assessment and Realignment, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1039, 
1045 (2013). 
59 P. Griffin & M. Bozynski, National Overviews: State Juvenile Justice Profiles (2003) at 
http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/.  Another study found that most states used some type of structured 
decisionmaking, but only a minority used empirically-validated risk assessment.  D.B. Towberman, A 
National Survey of Juvenile Risk Assessment, 43 JUVENILE & FAMILY CT. 61 (1992). 
60 Craig S. Schwalbe, Risk Assessment for Juvenile Justice: A Meta-Analysis, 31 LAW & HUM BEHAV. 
449 (2007). 
61 Implementing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice in Community Corrections, 2nd ed. (October 
2009). U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections. 
http://nicic.gov/Downloads/PDF/Library/024107.pdf. 
62 NYC Probation, at http://www.nyc.gov/html/prob/html/about/evidence.shtml (“Evidence-based 
policies and practices (EBPP) use current research and the best available data to guide decisions and 
produce the outcomes that our stakeholders—probation clients, victims, and communities—expect.”). 
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public safety.”63 One reason for this endorsement is that “in virtually every decision-
making situation for which the issue has been studied, it has been found that 
statistically developed predictive devices outperform human judgments… This is one 
of the best-established facts in the decision-making literature, and to find otherwise 
in criminal justice settings would be surprising (at best) and suspicious or very likely 
wrong (at worst).”64 The Model Penal Code recommends sentencing commissions 
“develop actuarial instruments or processes, supported by current and ongoing 
research, that will estimate the relative risks that individual offenders pose to public 
safety” to be incorporated into sentencing guidelines.65  The Code also calls for needs 
assessments to match offenders with rehabilitative interventions.66   
The ALI view of risk assessment in sentencing reflects a hybrid approach 
towards criminal punishment, incorporating retributive and utilitarian approaches.  
Broadly put, the retributive approach focuses backwards on an offender’s moral 
culpability for crime committed in the past, while the utilitarian approach focuses 
forwards on deterring future criminal acts by the offender or other would-be offenders 
(or by incapacitating the offender).  Many scholars argue that any workable theory of 
criminal punishment should address both retributive and utilitarian concerns.67 In 
an influential hybrid approach, Norval Morris developed a theory of “limiting 
retributivism” in which retributive principles may set an upper (and perhaps also a 
lower) limit on the severity of punishment, but within that range, utilitarian concerns 
can be taken into account.68  The Model Penal Code approach reflects this hybrid 
view, in which risk assessment does not entirely define the sentence, but risk 
assessment can be used to identify low risk offenders eligible for reduced sentences. 
Those who share a purely retributive approach towards criminal punishment 
would object to use of risk assessment (or any other utilitarian considerations) in 
criminal justice.  Thus, some, such as Bernard Harcourt, have objected to the use of 
prediction generally on grounds that justice should be individualized and that risk 
assessment is not compatible with traditional theories of just punishment.69  Our 
focus here is on critics of the move towards risk assessment who have raised a series 
of concerns that operate within the assumption that some hybrid of retributivism and 
utilitarianism are acceptable goals of criminal punishment.   
One set of concerns has to do with the quality of the predictions that risk 
assessment instruments provide.  For example, it is far more challenging to predict 
risk for relatively uncommon serious offenses than for relatively more numerous 
lower-risk offenses, for which there is far more data.  The Model Penal Code endorses 
                                               
63 Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 6.06(5) (Final Draft 2017).  
64 Michael Gottfredson and Donald Gottfredson, The Accuracy of Prediction, in Alfred Blumstein ed., 
Criminal Careers and Career Criminals 247 (1986).   
65 Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 6B.09(1) (Final Draft 2017).  
66 Id. at § 6B.09(1). 
67 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, at 472, in J. Wilson & J. Petersilia (Eds.), Crime and Public Policy 
(Oxford University Press, 2011). 
68 Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment (University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
69 Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age 
(2007). 
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the use of risk-assessment for lower-risk populations.70  An additional concern is with 
the time period during which the data relied upon are collected.  The Model Penal 
Code recommends that risk assessments tools be periodically reviewed for their 
reliability.71 Indeed, many risk assessment instruments used by parole boards, for 
example, have never been independently validated, have not been validated on in-
state populations, are not regularly updated, and are sometimes altered to add 
additional factors not part of the original instrument.72   
Others find the use of general data to inform individual decisionmaking itself 
unfair.  Expressing that view, then-Attorney General Eric Holder questioned the use 
of risk assessment in 2014, stating: “Using group data to make an individualized 
determination, I think, can result in fundamental unfairness.”73 The concepts of 
fairness and accuracy used in the risk assessment context may themselves need to be 
clarified and can create difficult trade-offs.74  
A central fairness concern is that racial disparities or disparities based on 
other invidious criteria will result from the use of risk assessment.75  For example, 
Pennsylvania considered a sentencing approach in which rural offenders were given 
fewer points in their risk scores than urban offenders, an approach that would have 
strongly correlated with race and that was rejected in 2017.76 Gender is a factor 
explicitly taken into account by some risk assessment instruments.  Sonja Starr has 
argued that doing so violates the Equal Protection Clause, since under intermediate 
scrutiny, such assessments use of a gender classification without a substantial state 
interest to justify doing so.77  Others have responded that use of gender as a factor in 
discretionary risk-assessment does not constitute a classification, and does not raise 
constitutional concerns, because (1) gender is empirically a highly predictive risk 
                                               
70 Id. at Comment (“From an actuarial perspective, attempts to identify persons of low recidivism risk 
are more often successful than attempts to identify persons who are unusually dangerous.”)  See 
Richard Berk and Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting Criminal Behavior: A 
Comparative Assessment, 12 J. OF CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 515 (2013).   
71 Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 6B.09(1). 
72 See Sarah Desmarais, Kiersten Johnson, and Jay Singh, Performance of Recidivism Risk Assessment 
Instruments in U.S. Correctional Settings, 13 PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES 206 (2016) (“For most 
instruments, predictive validity had been evaluated in one or two studies that met our inclusion 
criteria. Those studies often were completed by the developers of the instrument under investigation. 
Perhaps one our most striking findings, only two of the 53 studies reported on the interrater reliability 
of the risk assessments.” Id. at 216). See also Jay P. Singh, Daryl G. Kroner, J. Stephen Wormith, 
Sarah L. Desmarais, and Zachary Hamilton (eds.), Handbook of Recidivism Risk Assessment (2018). 
73 Holder: Big Data is Leading to ‘Fundamental Unfairness’ in Drug Sentencing, PBS News Hour, July 
31, 2014.  
74  See Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns, and Aaron Roth, Fairness in 
Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art, Sociological Methods & Research 1 (2018). 
75  For an discussion of the constitutional claims potentially raised in the area, see Aziz Z. Huq, Racial 
Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L. J. (2019).  
76Monahan and Skeem, supra.  
77 Starr, supra, at 824. See also J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables 
and Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1395-98 (2011). 
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factor for many types of offenses, and (2) avoiding gender as a risk factor for 
recidivism strongly works to the disadvantage of female offenders.78  
A separate concern is with transparency of the risk assessment instruments 
used.  Certain private companies have marketed software and they do not make 
public the factors relied upon in complex algorithms; one such algorithm, COMPAS, 
marketed by Northpointe, apparently relies on socio-economic and family factors,79 
and critics argue that although race is of course not a “static” factor in the algorithm, 
these “dynamic” factors likely correlate closely with race.  A ProPublica report called 
the software “biased against blacks.”80 In the widely discussed Loomis case in 
Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected an appeal by a person who objected 
at sentencing that he could not review the basis for the Northpointe software’s risk 
assessment, nor whether invidious factors or factors that have a disparate impact 
based on invidious criteria were relied upon.81  The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately 
denied certiorari in the case, but the case raised a serious due process concern that is 
likely to be litigated in future years. 
Others fear that using risk assessment is too incremental an approach towards 
the problem of mass incarceration and that more forceful interventions are needed.  
Thus, Jessica M. Eaglin has argued that evidence-based approaches are not the right 
way to reduce mass incarceration, questioning use of risk assessment.82  To date, risk 
assessment has not been used to dramatically reduce incarceration. 
How do judges use risk assessment?  That is the question which has been least 
explored, in our view, in the critical literature.  Critics have assumed that 
instruments, whether desirable or not, are uniformly applied by judges.  The Model 
Penal Code has recommended advisory use of risk assessment.  Where that is the 
case, the defendant can challenge the findings of an assessment “in open court,” and 
can “contest any adverse findings.”83 However, research suggests that 
decisionmakers do not always accurately perceive risk and that whether risk 
estimates are actually used may depend on the manner and format with which risk 
information is communicated.84  Whether judges appropriately follow the advisory or 
                                               
78 Jennifer Skeem, John Monahan & Christopher Lowenkamp, Gender, Risk Assessment, and 
Sanctioning: The Cost of Treating Women Like Men, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 580 (2016). 
79 See Northpointe Software Suite, at http://www.northpointeinc.com/products/northpointe-software-
suite.  
80 Julia Angwin, et al., Machine Bias, ProPublica, May 23, 2016. 
81 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016); cert. denied NO. 16-16387, 2017 WL 2722441 (June 
26, 2017). See also Alyssa Carlson, The Need for Transparency in the Age of Predictive Sentencing 
Algorithms, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 303 (2017). 
82 Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. Rev. 189 (2013). See also Katherine 
Beckett, The Politics, Promise, and Peril of Criminal Justice Reform in the Context of Mass 
Incarceration, 1 ANNUAL REV. CRIMINOLOGY 235 (2018); Jacob Kang-Brown, Oliver Hinds, Jasmine 
Heiss, and Olive Lu, The New Dynamics of Mass Incarceration (2018) at 
https://www.vera.org/publications/the-new-dynamics-of-mass-incarceration 
83 Model Penal Code: Sentencing Comment § 6B.09. 
84 J.G. Varela et. al, Same Score, Different Message: Perceptions of Offender Risk Depend on Static-99R 
Risk Communication Format, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 418-427 (2014).  
JUDGING RISK 
 
 
 
 
16 
even presumptive recommendations concerning risk assessment has been little-
studied in the literature.    That is the problem we turn to in the next Part.   
 
II.  EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 
 
If the reason why risk assessment is desirable is that “in virtually every 
decision-making situation for which the issue has been studied, it has been found that 
statistically developed predictive devices outperform human judgment,” then the 
question remains how well human decisionmakers actually use their judgment to 
incorporate the information from risk assessment.85  That question has not been 
carefully examined in the past.  Now that risk assessments are so commonly used by 
legal decisionmakers, it is a question that can and should be examined.  We examine 
that question by focusing first on the experience in Virginia with risk assessment in 
sentencing, based on several studies that we conducted, and then turning to evidence 
from other jurisdictions in which there is some evidence concerning judicial use of 
risk assessment instruments.  
 
A. The Virginia “Non-Violent Risk Assessment” Instrument 
 
The Virginia model for the use of risk assessment in sentencing is important 
to study because Virginia was the first state to make risk assessment a formal part 
of sentencing.  As a result, the Virginia model has received a great deal of attention 
from policymakers, judges, and scholars.  The revised Model Penal Code states: “On 
risk assessment as a prison-diversion tool, Virginia has been the leading innovator 
among American states.”86 The use of risk assessment in Virginia has been hailed as 
a “valuable test” case and a model that should encourage other states to adopt such 
a “ratchet-down” approach to the use of risk assessment in sentencing to reduce 
prison populations by identifying low-risk individuals.87 The Virginia risk instrument 
has been lauded based on its substance and the process used to develop it.  The 
instrument is transparent, publicly available, and validated within the state and 
more recently re-validated.88  Virginia’s instrument is simple and easy to understand.  
It involves “placing risk discretion in the courtroom.”89  We sought to assess that 
discretion: how is this risk instrument used by judges in practice? 
In 1994, the Virginia Legislature adopted so-called “truth-in-sentencing” 
legislation and abolished parole in the state. In order to avert a resulting fiscal 
“collapse”90 of the state’s prison system, risk assessment was adopted at the same 
                                               
85 Gottfredson and Gottfredson, supra note xxx at 247. 
Criminal Careers and Career Criminals (1986).   
86 Model Penal Code: Sentencing (Am. Law Inst., Final Draft, approved May 24, 2017) at 375. 
87 Kevin R. Reitz, “Risk Discretion” at Sentencing, 30 FED. SENT’G. REP. 70 (2017).  
88 Id. at 71. 
89 Id. 
90 Richard Kern, Overview of Virginia’s Truth-in-Sentencing System 15, 20 at 
http://sfc.virginia.gov/pdf/committee_meeting_presentations/June%2019%20meeting/Virginia%20Fel
ony%20Sentencing%20Guidelines.pdf. 
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time “to reduce the use of incarceration for nonviolent criminals, in order to offset the 
increased prison stays for violent offenders that were built into the original Virginia 
guidelines.”91  The Legislature directed the newly-formed Virginia Criminal 
Sentencing Commission (VCSC) to develop an empirically-based risk-assessment 
instrument.92  The goal lawmakers set out for the VCSC was to divert 25% of the 
“lowest-risk, incarceration-bound, drug and property offenders” from prison to 
alternative sanctions such as jail, probation, community service, outpatient 
substance-abuse or mental health treatment, or electronic monitoring.93 In the words 
of Richard Kern, the first Director of the VCSC, among the “main goals of the 1994 
sentencing reforms” was to “expand alternative punishment/treatment options for 
some non-violent felons” by adopting statistical instruments “to divert low risk 
offenders” from prison.94 
The instrument was developed by 1996 and was implemented at pilot sites in 
1997.95 The instrument is administered only to offenders for whom the state’s 
sentencing guidelines recommend incarceration in prison or jail. In addition, 
offenders must meet certain eligibility criteria (e.g., a criminal history of only 
nonviolent offenses). If the offender’s total score on the instrument is below a given 
cut-off, he or she is recommended for an alternative, community-based sanction; if 
the offender’s score on the instrument is above that cut-off, the prison or jail term 
recommended by the sentencing guidelines remains in effect.  The National Center 
for State Courts (NCSC) evaluated the use of the instrument at the pilot sites from 
1998 to 2001.96  The VCSC then conducted a validation study of the instrument to 
prepare it for state-wide use; the goal was to designate as lower-risk the group of 
                                               
91 Kevin Reitz, “Risk Discretion” at Sentencing, 30 FED. SENT’G. REP. 68, 70 (2017). See also Richard 
Kern and Mark Bergstrom, A View from the Field: Practitioners’ Response to Actuarial Sentencing: An 
“Unsettled” Proposition, 25 Federal Sentencing Reporter 185, 188 (2013) (the adoption of risk 
assessment in Virginia was driven in large part by “budgetary concerns”); Richard Kern and Meredith 
Farrer-Owens, Sentencing Guidelines with Integrated Offender Risk Assessment, 16 FED. SENT’G. REP. 
165, 169 (2004) (“The non-violent risk assessment tool adopted as part of the discretionary sentencing 
guidelines serves to safely divert a significant share of low risk felons away from expensive prison beds 
into less costly alternative punishment programs.”) 
92 For a description of this process, see Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, 2005 Annual Report 
35 (2015), at https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2005/RD42/PDF. 
93 Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 91 at `65; Meredith Farrar-Owens, The Evolution of Sentencing 
Guidelines in Virginia: An Example of the Importance of Standardized and Automated Felony 
Sentencing Data, 25 FED. SENT’G. REP. 168, 170 (2013). 
94 Kern, supra note 90. 
95 2005 Annual Report, supra note 92, at 35. The risk factors included on the original assessment tool 
developed by the VCSC consisted of six types of variables: offense type, whether the offender is 
currently charged with an additional offense, “offender characteristics” (i.e., gender, age, employment, 
and marital status), whether the offender had been arrested or confined within the past 18 months, 
prior felony convictions, and prior adult incarcerations.   
96 National Center for State Courts, Offender Risk Assessment in Virginia: A Three Stage Evaluation 
(2002), at http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/risk_off_rpt.pdf. 
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individuals with an approximately 85% likelihood of not having a felony conviction 
within three years of release from confinement.97   
The instrument was adopted state-wide in 2002, for all felony larceny, fraud, 
and drug cases.98  Thus, in 2002, the NVRA was included as one of the sentencing 
worksheets to be completed for all eligible offenders convicted of one of four drug and 
property crimes—Larceny, Fraud, Drug Schedule I/II (e.g. possession of cocaine), and 
Drug/Other (i.e., marijuana distribution).  In 2012, the Commission re-validated its 
risk-assessment instruments on large samples of eligible drug and larceny/fraud 
offenders.99 The instruments for each offense examine only the following static 
factors: (1) offender age at the time of the offense; (2) gender; (3) prior adult felony 
convictions; (4) prior adult incarcerations; (5) whether the person was legally 
restrained at the time of the offense100; and for drug offenses, additionally (1) prior 
juvenile adjudication, and (2) prior arrest or confinement within past twelve months 
rather than legal restraint at the time of offense.101  If the offender’s total score on 
the instrument is below the cut-off, the offender is recommended for an alternative 
sanction.  If the offender’s score on the instrument is above the cut-off, the prison or 
jail term recommended by the sentencing guidelines remains in effect.   
Since the NVRA instrument was adopted as part of the sentencing guidelines 
that were adjusted in 1994, use of the NVRA is not considered a “departure” from the 
sentencing guidelines.  Rather, an alternative sentence, when provided after using 
the NVRA, is considered in compliance with the guidelines.  After the NVRA is 
completed, judges have complete discretion whether or not to follow the 
recommendation for an alternative sentence.  Judges also have discretion regarding 
which alternative sentence, if any, to impose. 
                                               
97 2005 Annual Report, supra note xxx, at 35, 78, 84 (“According to the Commission’s data, less than 
17% of the offenders recommended for an alternative sanction by the risk instrument were identified 
as recidivists.”).   
98 Re-validation of the Nonviolent Offender Risk Assessment Instrument: Study Update, at 
http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/Nonviolent%20Offender%20Risk%20Assessment%20Update%2011-14-
11%20HANDOUT.pdf. 
99 In these samples, 63% of drug offenders scored in the low-risk group and 37% scored in a higher-
risk group, while 43% of the larceny/fraud offenders scored in the low-risk group and 57% scored in a 
higher-risk group. Recidivism in this research was defined as reconviction for a felony offense within 
three years of release from incarceration. Of drug offenders designated as low risk, 12% recidivated; 
by comparison, 44% of higher-risk drug offenders recidivated. Of larceny/fraud offenders designated 
as low risk, 19% recidivated; by comparison, 38% of higher-risk larceny/fraud offenders recidivated. 
Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, 2012 Annual Report (2012), 
http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/2012VCSCAnnualReport.pdf. 
100 Virginia Sentencing Guidelines, Larceny, Section D, at 
http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/worksheets_2012/Larceny.pdf.  
101 Virginia Sentencing Guidelines, Drug/Schedule I/II Section D, at 
http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/worksheets_2016/Drug-I_II2.pdf.  
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We aimed to study whether the non-violent risk assessment instrument is 
being used divert from prison, 25% of the “lowest-risk, incarceration-bound, drug and 
property offenders,” and if so, what types of alternative sentences they receive.102    
 
B.  Judicial Reliance on The Non-Violent Risk Assessment Instrument 
 
 We reviewed 2016 sentencing data shared with us by the VCSC concerning the 
use of the NVRA instrument.103  The use of this instrument is important in a large 
number of cases; over 8,000 people were convicted of eligible offenses in Virginia in 
fiscal 2016.  In that year, there were a total of 23,713 sentencing guidelines 
worksheets received by the Commission.104  Thus, one quarter of felony convicts were 
convicted of crimes that were eligible for the use of the NVRA.  Of those, 6,787 people 
were eligible offenders for whom a risk assessment form was received.  Over a 
thousand additional offenders were eligible offenders for whom a risk assessment 
form was not filled out or shared by the judge with the VCSC. The Table below 
displays our analysis of the receipt of alternative sentences under the NVRA in fiscal 
2016.   
 
Table 1: NVRA Eligible Offenders Who Received an Alternative Sanction  
 
 NVRA Recommendation  
  
Alt. Sanction 
 
Higher Risk 
  
Low Risk 
  
Missing 
  
Total 
Imposed 
 
  
941 
23.4% 
  
1,433 
42.2% 
  
408 
39.7% 
  
2,782 
 
Not Imposed 
 
  
3,079 
76.6% 
  
1,963 
57.8% 
  
619 
60.3% 
  
5,661 
 
Total 
 
4,020 
47.6% 
3,396 
40.2% 
1,027 
12.2% 
8,443 
 
 
 Of the entire population of 8,443 offenders eligible for risk assessment under 
the NVRA, 3,396 or 40.2% scored in the category of least violent offenders, and were 
                                               
102 See Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, Re-validation of the Nonviolent Offender Risk 
Assessment Instrument: Study Update 4 (2011), at 
http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/Nonviolent%20Offender%20Risk%20Assessment%20Update%2011-14-
11%20HANDOUT.pdf (summarizing data from 2002 to 2010, and showing beginning in 2005, a 
consistent group of about 50% were eligible as low-risk offenders, for alternative sentences). 
103 These data were presented to the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission at its April 9, 2018 
meeting.  The materials presented, including PowerPoint, are available on the VCSC website: 
http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/meetings.html.   
104 Id. at 14. 
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therefore eligible for an alternative sentence.  Of those, only 42.2% (1,433 people) did 
in fact receive such an alternative sentence. Of violent offenders, 23.4% (941 people) 
received alternative sentences.  
Of the group of offenders for whom NVRA information was missing, 39.7% (408 
people) received alternative sentences.  For that group, the NVRA information was 
not included in the sentencing record; it is not known whether that information was 
considered or not.  The cases in which the NVRA was missing are systematically 
different than those in which the NVRA was filled out in the following main ways:  
the sentencing information was far more likely to be prepared by a commonwealth 
attorney (83% vs. 53%); the cases were far more likely to include a written plea 
agreement (62% vs. 39%) and/or a guilty plea (94% vs. 87%).  It is possible that 
commonwealth’s attorneys and defense attorneys sometimes considered the NVRA 
when negotiating plea bargains, even if it was not filled out. 
Second, we examined what types of alternative sentences were offered under 
the NVRA.  Those alternatives range from jail-time to release for time served or under 
supervised probation, and they also include rehabilitative options such as drug 
treatment.   Table 2, below, displays for all eligible offenders who received an 
alternative sentence in FY 2016, which type of alternative sentences were imposed.  
Since cases may, and often do, involve more than one type of alternative sanction, the 
totals add up to more than 100% of cases. 
 
Table 2: Types of Alternative Sanctions Imposed in NVRA Cases 
 
 
4
Table 2: Types of Alternative Sanctions Imposed
Sanction Cases (N) Cases (%)
Supervised Probation 1,238 86.39
Diverted from Prison to Jail 680 47.45
Restitution 496 34.61
Unsupervised Probation 314 21.91
Substance Abuse Treatment 284 19.82
Fines 178 12.42
Time Served 159 11.10
Diversion Center 105 7.33
Detention Center 69 4.82
Comprehensive Community Corrections 61 4.26
First O↵ender 59 4.12
Electronic Monitoring 40 2.79
Day Reporting 40 2.79
Litter Control 35 2.44
Intensive Supervision 20 1.40
Drug Court 15 1.05
Work Release 3 0.21
Youth O↵ender 1 0.07
Sample: Individuals who were recommended for, and received, alt. sanction(s)
Total Observations: 1,433.
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The most common alternative sanction offered was supervised probation, with almost 
half of those receiving alternative sentences receiving jail-time.  Jail, as opposed to 
prison, while they both involve incarceration, may be a somewhat more lenient option 
in that it may be easier for relatives to maintain visits.  
The variation between judicial districts and judges was also striking.  There 
are 120 Circuit Courts in Virginia, organized into 31 Circuits.  The Circuits varied 
widely in the ratios of those diverted, in the ratios of missing NVRAs, and in provision 
of alternative sentences to persons who score low versus high risk under the NVRA.  
The 31 Circuits had a mean alternative sentencing rate of 33%, with a minimum of 
19% diverted and a maximum of 54% diverted.  Low risk alternative sentencing rates 
varied by Circuit from 22% to 67%. Higher risk alternative sentencing rates varied 
by Circuit from 11% to 51%.  The variation among individual Circuit Court judges 
was as follows: judges had a mean alternative sentencing rate of 32%, with a 
minimum of 11% diverted and a maximum of 65% diverted. Low risk alternative 
sentencing rates varied among individual judges from 7% to 85%. Higher risk 
alternative sentencing rates varied among individual judges from 0% to 60%. 
If the NVRA was intended to provide more uniformity among courts and 
judges, that goal does not yet appear to have been achieved.  That said, we express 
no view on the optimal level of consistency among courts and judges.  Different courts 
or different judges may have different offender populations or resources available to 
them.  The judicial survey, which we describe next, addresses some of those questions. 
 
C.  Judicial Survey Findings 
 
 In addition to analyzing sentencing data concerning low-risk offenders in 
Virginia, we aimed to study why judges differ so widely in their use of risk assessment 
information. There have been very few efforts to survey judges to assess their 
attitudes regarding their use of risk assessment in the United States.   
We located one such survey: a recent white paper by Steven Chanenson and 
Jordan Hyatt.  That paper asks whether judges use risk assessment well and notes 
how little data we have on that question.  They conducted a survey of judicial 
attitudes, surveying 137 judges in 37 states, including both state and county-level 
judges.105  Acknowledging that it was a “non-representative and small sample,” the 
authors noted that the effort at least provided some suggestive data on the question. 
They found that many judges were familiar with risk assessment but believed that 
“their judgment was more accurate than actuarial at-sentencing assessments.”106  
Judges were more favorable towards the use of risk assessment to release low-risk 
individuals than to imprison high-risk offenders, and the vast majority supported the 
                                               
105 Steven L. Chanenson and Jordan M. Hyatt, The Use of Risk Assessment at Sentencing: Implications 
for Research and Policy (2016), at 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&https
redir=1&article=1201&context=wps.  
106 Id. at 10.  
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use of risk assessment in sentencing in some manner.107  We also located a survey of 
judges and probation officers concerning juvenile justice in four states; it found that 
half frequently override recommendations from both needs and risk assessments (the 
distinction between the two is discussed more in Part IV).  Their overrides were 
particularly high regarding community and residential placements for which there 
was limited availability.108  The authors of the study concluded that lack of training, 
inadequate resources, and inappropriate instruments hampered the use of risk 
assessment.109 
 Judges in many states, including Virginia, are the primary “consumers” of risk 
assessment at sentencing, yet their views on risk assessment are not typically 
solicited.  In Virginia, since the NVRA instrument was adopted statewide in 2002, we 
expected that judges would be familiar with the instrument and able to comment on 
how they use it.  We sent judges a brief survey asking them to answer several 
questions concerning the use of the risk assessment. 110     The survey was anonymous.  
We also included postcards that judges could separately mail if they agreed to be 
interviewed further concerning their views on the use of the NVRA, with results to 
be similarly described with anonymity for participating judges.  We conducted the 
survey between November 2017 and January 2018, sending the survey by mail to all 
161 Circuit Court judges in Virginia. In Virginia, each city and county has a Circuit 
Court, which handles all criminal felony cases.  There are 31 Circuits and 161 Circuit 
Court judges.  Virginia is one of two states in which judges are selected by legislative 
election, based on a majority vote of the Virginia House of Delegates and Senate.  
Circuit Court judges serve for terms of eight years.   
We received responses from 85 judges (a response rate of 52.8 percent).  To our 
knowledge, this is the highest response rate reported to a statewide judicial survey. 
(We note that surveys of federal judges conducted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
have reported similarly high response rates.)111  We found, in summary,112 that: 
                                               
107 Id. at 10.  
108 Jeffrey Shook and Rosemary C. Sarri, Structured Decisionmaking in Juvenile Justice: Judges’ and 
Probation Officers’ Perceptions and Use, 29 CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1335 (2007).  
109 Id. at 1335. 
110 We are grateful to the Chief Justice Donald Lemons of the Virginia Supreme Court, who provided 
a cover letter encouraging Virginia judges to participate in the survey. These data were presented to 
the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission at its April 9, 2018 meeting.  The materials, including 
PowerPoint, are available on the Commission’s website: http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/meetings.html. 
Statistical analyses of survey data can be found in John Monahan, Anne L. Metz, & Brandon L. 
Garrett, Judicial Appraisals of Risk Assessment in Sentencing, Behavioral Sciences and the Law (in 
press).  
111 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Results of 2014 Survey of United States District Judges (2015), at 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-projects-
andsurveys/surveys/20150225_Judges_Survey.pdf. 
112 The survey first asked Virginia judges whether sentencing of drug and property offenders should 
be based only on the seriousness of the crime, or also on the risk that the offender will commit another 
crime in the future.  Second, the survey asked how familiar judges were with the use of the NVRA for 
sentencing drug and property offenders in Virginia. Third, the survey asked how often the judge 
considers the results of the NVRA before sentencing a drug or property offender.  Fourth, the survey 
JUDGING RISK 
 
 
 
 
23 
Eight-out-of-ten judges believe that sentencing drug and property offenders should 
be based not only on the seriousness of the crime committed and the offender’s 
blameworthiness, but also on the risk the offender will commit another crime in the 
future.  In addition, eight-out-of-ten judges state that they are either “familiar” or 
“very familiar” with the use of NVRA instrument in sentencing drug and property 
offenders.  However, somewhat fewer, or approximately half of all judges state that 
they “always” or “almost always” consider the results of the NVRA instrument in 
sentencing drug and property offenders, and approximately one-third state that they 
“usually” do so.  Indeed, approximately half of all judges state that they rely equally 
on the NVRA instrument and on their judicial experience in sentencing a drug or 
property offender, and approximately one-third state that they rely primarily on their 
judicial experience. 
In explaining how they exercise discretion, we found that seven-out-of-ten 
judges rate availability of alternative interventions—such as outpatient drug or 
mental health programs—within their jurisdiction as “less than adequate,” and five 
percent rate such alternatives as “virtually non-existent.”  In addition, three-quarters 
of the judges responded affirmatively when asked whether an increase in availability 
of alternative interventions for drug and property offenders would change their 
sentencing practices.  
We also asked about whether adopting a policy requiring judges to provide a 
written reason for declining to impose an alternative intervention on an offender who 
scores as “low risk” would increase the likelihood of judges imposing such alternative 
interventions.Six-in-ten judges believe that such a policy would increase the use of 
alternatives, and four-in-ten believe that it would not do so.  However, when asked if 
they favored or opposed the adoption of the policy described in the previous question, 
one-third of the judges responded that they favored adopting such a policy, and two-
thirds responded that they opposed it. 
After completing the survey, judges also had the opportunity to provide 
additional written comments.  Judges were candid in their views of risk assessment.  
Some were quite opposed to the use of risk assessment generally.  Others described 
the need for more treatment resources in their districts.   
Our survey yielded three primary conclusions. First, a strong majority of 
Virginia judges endorsed the principle that sentencing eligible offenders should 
include a consideration of the risk the persons will commit new crimes.  The judges 
are familiar with the use of the NVRA in sentencing, and usually or always consider 
the results of the NVRA in relevant cases. Judges reported that the NVRA: 
“Constitutes a useful tool within the general sentencing scheme.”  Another judge said 
                                               
asked whether judges rely on their judicial experience or on the NVRA to determine the risk that an 
offender will commit another time. Fifth, the survey asked how judges would rate the current 
availability of alternative sanctions, such as outpatient drug or mental health programs. Sixth, the 
survey asked whether availability of more alternative sanctions would change sentencing practices.  
Finally, the survey asked whether it would affect the use of alternative sanctions if the NVRA was 
presumptive, and were judges were required to provide a reason in writing for declining to impose an 
alternative sanction.  We also asked judges whether they would favor the adoption of such a procedure.   
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that: “I support the use of these risk assessments under current usage—specifically 
the risk assessment is used to reduce and not increase incarceration 
recommendations.”  A more skeptical judge said that “[i]t should be clarified to judges 
and litigants alike that Evidence Based Practices like the Nonviolent Risk 
Assessment are but another tool that aids but does not supplant judicial judgment.” 
In contrast, a significant minority exclude considerations of risk when 
sentencing eligible drug and property offenders and are largely unfamiliar with the 
NVRA. For example, one judge said: 
 
“Frankly, I pay very little attention to the [NVRA] worksheets. Attorneys 
argue about them, but I really just look at the Guidelines.  I also don’t go to 
psychics.” 
 
Second, a strong majority of judges find the availability of alternative 
interventions for eligible drug and property offenders in their communities to be 
inadequate at best.  Those judges stated that they believe that an increase in the 
availability of alternative interventions would change their sentencing practices. 
As one judge put it: “The assessment is useful. The problem is the lack of useful 
alternatives. In several counties in my Circuit, there are no inpatient treatment 
options.”  Another judge said, “We need more alternative options—lack sufficient 
treatment programs and follow-up.  Unfortunately, that costs money which 
communities are reluctant to provide.”  Or another judge said, “bona fide alternative 
programs must first exist.”  One judge said, offering still more detailed concerns: 
 
There is presently no valid alternative in our area.  Referral to local mental 
health takes 13 weeks for the initial interview.  Who knows how long to start 
treatment… We need a statute which requires that all areas of the state have 
equal access to drug treatment. 
 
Third, a majority of judges believe adopting a policy requiring a written reason 
for declining to impose an alternative intervention on eligible offenders who score as 
“low risk” would increase the likelihood such sentences would be imposed.  Currently, 
Virginia judges are asked to provide reasons when departing from sentencing 
guidelines, but the use or non-use of the NVRA is not considered a sentencing 
departure.  Requiring judges to express reasons might affect their behavior.  
However, a majority of judges oppose the adoption of such a policy.  Virginia judges 
responded, for example: 
 
Having to write out reasons for Guidelines departure is already an added time 
and effort burden on the sentencing process.  To add another requirement to 
explain the sentencing decision would simply complicate and drag out the 
sentencing even more. 
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Another judge added, “At some point someone must realize that adding more 
paperwork. . . takes time and when court staffing remains the same, this takes time 
away from hearing cases, deciding cases, reading, signing orders, etc.”  Another judge, 
similarly noted the time it would take to provide reasons for not following NVRA 
recommendations: “Requiring judges to take 3-10 minutes per such sentencing to 
explain will be an unnecessary drag on our criminal dockets.” 
In conclusion, we found that most judges are familiar with and embrace risk 
assessment as a major consideration in sentencing property and drug offenders, but 
find that community alternatives to imprisonment in their jurisdictions are often 
scarce.  Further, most judges oppose the adoption of a policy requiring them to write 
out reasons for declining to impose alternative interventions on low risk offenders. 
Judicial education in structured risk assessment,113 increased resources for 
community programs addressing criminogenic needs, and the adoption of automated 
web-based information systems may make help realize the promise of risk 
assessment as a means of reducing mass incarceration. 
 
III.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS  
 
 As risk assessment has been increasingly used in criminal justice settings, 
more data has emerged regarding how judges and other decisionmakers use such 
assessments in practice.  The evidence is not encouraging but it is highly informative.  
Consistent with research on structured decisionmaking generally, the evidence 
suggests that decisionmakers do not take account of quantitative information when 
they do not value it or it is not incorporated into the structure of their work.  Where 
decisionmakers appreciate the value of quantitative evidence, it informs their goals, 
and it is well incorporated into their work, they can make better use of the 
information.  Below we discuss evidence from risk assessment in pretrial 
decisionmaking in Kentucky, which Megan Stevenson has studied, and evidence from 
risk assessment in probation in Pennsylvania, which Richard Berk and others have 
studied.   
 
A.  Pretrial Risk Assessment in Kentucky 
 
Kentucky is one of a growing group of states that now requires risk assessment 
in pretrial decisionmaking.114  Kentucky is only one of a handful of states to eliminate 
                                               
113 We asked the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to share the training that judges receive 
on the use of the NVRA.  That training consisted of two PowerPoint slides that are a part of a twenty-
six slide pre-bench training that newly appointed judges receive.  That training briefly explains what 
the NVRA is, that alternative sanctions are possible for eligible offenders, and notes that “compliance 
with the risk assessment recommendation is discretionary.”  In addition, failure to follow sentencing 
guidelines is not reviewable on appeal in Virginia.  No further judicial training is provided on the 
NVRA at present. 
114 John Clark, Pretrial Justice Inst., The Fundamentals of Pretrial Risk Assessment: Achieving Inter-
Rater Reliability 10 (2014) (listing states that use pre-trial risk assessment, at that time, as: Colorado, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Jersey, and West Virginia); Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing 
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commercial bail, which it did in 1976 legislation.115 In 2011, lawmakers enacted a 
Public Safety and Offender Accountability Act, which required use of “evidence-based 
practices to reduce the likelihood of future criminal behavior,” including the use of 
risk assessment to make decisions regarding pre-trial release.116 The pre-existing 
state criminal procedure statute had required that a judge release a defendant on 
personal recognizance or an unsecured bail bond, unless the judge decided “in the 
exercise of discretion” that such release will not “reasonably assure” the appearance 
of the defendant in court; such discretion shall rely with “due consideration” to 
recommendations of the pre-trial services agency.117  
Implementing this legislation, in 2013, the Kentucky Supreme Court issued an 
order requiring all judges to expedite release of pre-trial offenders who score a low to 
moderate risk using the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) risk assessment developed 
by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation.118 If judges chose to impose cash bail, they 
have to provide written reasons for doing so.  However, many judges did not follow 
the recommendations of the instrument.119  Some judges simply write “flight risk” or 
“danger” as their reason for not using the PSA.120 One prosecutor even created 
bumper stickers objecting to risk assessment, stating: “Catch and release is for fish 
not felons.”121  In 2017, the Kentucky Supreme Court issued a new rule making the 
program “uniform” for judges, expanding the applicability of risk assessment to new 
classes of defendants, and asking pretrial services to provide bi-annual reports to the 
Chief Justice to monitor the judicial use of the risk assessment.122 
In a forthcoming paper, “Assessing Risk Assessment in Action,” Megan 
Stevenson has analyzed data from Kentucky  from 2009 to 2016 (pre-dating the most 
recent 2017 Kentucky Supreme Court rule).123  Analyzing over 1.5 million criminal 
cases resulting from an arrest for a new criminal offense, Stevenson found that the 
adoption of pretrial risk assessment had a sharp effect in 2011 upon release rates, 
                                               
Conjecture with Formula for Bail, NY Times (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html (describing 
use of pre-trial risk assessment in 21 states). 
115 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.510 (1). 
116 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.066; see also John D. Minton, Jr., Laurie Dudgeon & Connie Payne, Report 
on Impact of House Bill 463: Outcomes, Challenges, and Recommendations 4 (2012); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 196.288 (measurement and documentation of cost savings resulting from reduced 
incarceration).  
117 KY. R. CRIM. P. 4.10. 
118 Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Results from the First Six Months of the Public Safety 
Assessment – Court in Kentucky (July 2014), at http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/PSA-Court-Kentucky-6-Month-Report.pdf. 
119 Robert Veldman, Pretrial Detention in Kentucky: An Analysis of the Impact of House Bill 463 During 
the First Two Years of its Implementation, 102 KENTUCKY L. J. 777, 778 (2013). 
120 Alysia Santo, Kentucky’s Protracted Struggle to Get Rid of Bail, Nov. 12, 2015, Marshall Project, at 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/11/12/kentucky-s-protracted-struggle-to-get-rid-of-bail. 
121 Id. 
122 Supreme Court of Kentucky, Amended Order, In Re: Authorization for the Non-Financial Uniform 
Schedule of Bail Administrative Release Program, 2016-10, at 
https://courts.ky.gov/courts/supreme/Rules_Procedures/201610.pdf.  
123 Stevenson, supra note xxx.  
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but that effect immediately began to fall.124  When the Kentucky Supreme Court 
adopted the PSA in 2013, the same effect was observed, with an initial increase in 
release rates, followed by a decline in release rates.125  Over time, Stevenson 
describes, judges reverted to their prior habits in bail-setting pretrial; the increase in 
release rates was “shortlived,” and by 2015, release rates  were lower than they had 
been prior to the 2011 legislation.126  Stevenson found no meaningful change in the 
pre-trial arrest rate during this time period, and an increase in pre-trial failure to 
appear. 127  Stevenson also found very different responses based on type of 
jurisdiction, with urban regions far more likely to experience a decline in their pre-
trial release rates.128  Stevenson notes that in part due to this variation between 
urban and rural jurisdictions, and with disproportionately white rural jurisdictions 
relying on the risk assessment instrument to release pre-trial more often, there was 
no detectable impact of the adoption of risk assessment on racial disparities in pre-
trial release in Kentucky.129 
Stevenson’s results are consistent with the frustration the Kentucky Supreme 
Court has itself expressed in adopting new measures to try to corral judges into 
implementing risk assessment pretrial.  James Doyle has written that this experience 
suggests that “covert work rules, workarounds, and informal drift will always 
develop, no matter what the formal requirements imposed from above try to 
require.”130  What Stevenson documents,  is that not only may judges return to prior 
practices, but even increased use of risk assessment may be uneven and may not 
improve outcomes in the intended manner.  Time will tell whether the Kentucky court 
rule adopted in 2017 is any more successful than prior interventions.  As we describe 
in the next Part, a different approach towards educating judges and restructuring 
their decisionmaking may be needed. 
 
B.  Additional Risk Assessment Jurisdictions 
 
 Despite the use of risk assessment instruments at almost all phases of the 
criminal justice process across  a large number of state and local jurisdictions, we 
typically do not know how jurisdictions are actually using risk assessment 
instruments in practice.131  Thus, in Arizona, a risk instrument has been encouraged 
state-wide, but not required and not incorporated into guidelines.  Steven Chanenson 
and Jordan Hyatt report anecdotal evidence that lawyers in Arizona sometimes use 
                                               
124 Id. at 36.  
125 Id. at 36-39.  
126 Id. at 40.  
127 Id. at 42-43.  
128 Id. at 47.  
129 Id. at 47.  
130 James M. Doyle, Fewer Prisoners, Less Crime?  The Elusive Promise of Algorithms, The Crime 
Report, Nov. 14, 2017. 
131 For a recent study of pretrial risk assessment in 30 jurisdictions, see Matthew DeMichele et al  
What do Criminal Justice Professionals Think About Risk Assessment at Pretrial? (2018), at 
www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/4-Criminal-Justice-Professionals.pdf  
JUDGING RISK 
 
 
 
 
28 
that information in plea negotiations and that judges sometimes consider the risk 
assessment, but the impact of it is unclear. 132  There is no systematic evidence 
documenting those results.  To provide another example, in Utah, judges are provided 
as part of pre-sentencing reports, evidence from a risk assessment instrument, but 
there has been no evaluation of the use of that instrument or study of its use by 
researchers.  The 2015 Justice Reinvestment Initiative legislation emphasized that 
judges should use risk assessment, but we do not know if they in fact are doing so or 
if so how they are doing so. 133   
In 2016, journalists reported the results of a review of over 1,500 cases in 
Chicago in which judges 85% of the time made bail decisions contrary to a new risk 
instrument to be used to help determine pre-trial decisions.134  The review found that 
the amount and conditions of bail varied widely by judge.  The Illinois Supreme Court 
Justice raised the concern that these judges are not just unwilling to use risk 
assessment but “they are not being sufficiently trained and supervised and are not 
being held accountable by the system.”135  Attitudes towards types of crimes may also 
explain the judicial resistance to the risk assessment.  The review noted that bail was 
most commonly required for gun possession charges, with bail set for 98% of suspects, 
while the risk assessment called for it in only about 5% of such cases. 136 
In Maryland, in response to concerns about the constitutionality of the use of 
bail, the Court of Appeals adopted rules intended to end the use of cash bail; in 
response, according to a study, detention rates have apparently increased, as judges 
have issued “no bond” detention orders rather than use cash bail.137  The University 
of Baltimore Pre-Trial Justice Clinic analyzed data from Prince George’s County, and 
found that while cash bail declined 11 percent, detention without bond rose almost 
15 percent.138  Professor Colin Starger commented that: “In a time where judges are 
politically accountable, there’s a fear you’re going to release someone who will go on 
to commit a crime so there’s a lot of public pressure to detain people.” 139 
A study by Richard Berk examined the use of risk assessment by the 
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, which commissioned a machine-
learning study to develop prediction instruments.  The information generated by the 
instrument was provided to the Board members as they made decisions, beginning in 
2013.  The risk information, if used, could have reduced recidivism substantially; 58% 
of those released on parole reoffended within two years, while the risk instrument 
predicted that if those recommended had been released, the recidivism rate would 
                                               
132 Chanenson and Hyatt, supra, at 7.  
133 Id. at 11.  
134 Main, infra note 16 (describing Chicago data concerning non-use of pre-trial risk assessment by 
judges). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137  Lynh Bui, Reforms intended to end excessive cash bail in Md. are keeping more in jail longer, report 
says, Washington Post, July 2, 2018. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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have been 27%.140  The study concluded that when they began to use the instrument, 
there was “little change after the forecasts became available in the proportions of 
inmates released for different levels of forecasted risk and the reliabilities 
attached.”141 The Board largely followed their same practices.  Perhaps this was 
because of inertia; these forecasts were advisory, after all, and: “All members of the 
Board were experienced and highly credentialed. There was no reason to expect that 
old ways that had served them well would be rapidly altered.”142 A second study by 
Berk examined risk assessment in corrections, and found that using a risk 
assessment instrument better predicted inmate violence than traditional 
classifications used by prison administrators.143 A final study by Jill Viglione, Daniell 
S. Rudes, and Faye S. Taxman examining the use of risk and needs assessment in 
two adult probation districts in a state found that the tool was overwhelmingly 
administered, but “rarely” linked the resulting scores to their management or 
supervision decisions.144 
 
C. Non-Risk Assessment Jurisdictions 
 
We can also learn from jurisdictions that do not use risk assessment.  One case 
in point is North Carolina.  In North Carolina, risk assessment is not used, except in 
a few pilot jurisdictions, concerning bail and pre-trial decisionmaking.145  However, 
the statute does not preclude a judge’s consideration on pre-trial risk; in an open-
ended way it provides for a right to have a judge set conditions for release.146  
Inconsistent with that preference, the statute then conveys the notion that pre-trial 
risk should be assessed by focusing on what the criminal charges are, and the way to 
address the risk posed by those charges is to impose money bail.  Thus, North 
Carolina statutory provisions require judicial officials to impose a secured bond “[i]f 
the judicial official determines that the defendant poses a danger to the public,” or if 
                                               
140 Id. at 3. 
141 Richard Berk, An Impact Assessment of Machine Learning Risk Forecasts on Parole Board Decisions 
and Recidivism, 13 J. EXP. CRIMINOL. 193, 193 (2017) 
142 Id. 
143 Richard Berk et al., A Randomized Experiment Testing Inmate Classification Systems, 2 CRIMINOL. 
& PUB. POL’Y 215, 232 (2003). 
144 Jill Viglione, Daniell S. Rudes, and Faye S. Taxman, Misalignment in Supervision: Implementing 
Risk/Needs Assessment Instruments in Probation, 42 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 263 (2015). See also Joel 
Miller and Carrie Maloney, Practitioner Compliance With Risk/Needs Assessment Tools: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Assessment, 40 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 716 (2013) (surveying a national sample of probation 
and parole officers and finding that half “were ‘formal’ in their compliance [with risk assessment 
instruments]: filling out the tools, but often making decisions that did not correspond with tool results” 
Id at 716.) 
145 Criminal Investigation and Adjudication Committee Report, Evidence-Based Recommendations to 
Improve the State’s Criminal Justice System, Appendix C, Pre-Trial Justice 40 n.121 (October 2016) 
[NCCALJ Final Report], at https://nccalj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/pdf/nccalj_criminal_investigation_and_adjudication_committee_report_pretrial
_justice.pdf. 
146 Id. at 32; see also N.C. G.S. § 15A-533.  
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a defendant commits a crime on pretrial release, an official can double the amount of 
money required.147 Such statutes focus judges on pre-trial risk, but they conflate 
public safety with imposition of a money bond, and risk is considered to be reflected 
only by the criminal charges, and not by other evidence such as risk assessment.  For 
that reason, a task force in North Carolina suggests that in order to change 
decisionmaking the system must overcome “faulty assumptions,” which will require 
more than just adopting  risk assessment.148  
 
IV.  REGULATING RISK ASSESSMENT IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
The experience of a range of jurisdiction with risk assessment adds support to 
our concern that far more attention must be paid to the structure of decisionmaking 
that is supposed to be informed by risk assessment.  Empirical research on judges 
has generally asked whether extra-legal factors influence their decisionmaking  and 
has found that judges, like all decisionmakers, can be influenced by forms of biasing 
information .149  These problems are not unique to the risk assessment setting.  For 
example, in the area of forensic science, judges have been criticized for not applying 
scientific criteria for screening out unreliable and invalid forensic evidence.150 Efforts 
to encourage judges to use more stringent gatekeeping in the forensic science area 
have been largely unsuccessful.151   
  In this Part, we develop proposals for improving how decisionmaking can be 
designed to encourage actual deliberation and more thoughtful use of risk assessment 
and we discuss how they fit in with a Due Process framework for judicial review.  In 
this Article, we provide a roadmap for: (1) presenting risk information in a more 
comprehensible way to decisionmakers; (2) structuring decisionmaking to better 
make use of that information; and (3) accompanying these reforms with ongoing 
monitoring, through judicial review and open peer review, of data to assess on-the-
ground use of risk assessment. Section A discusses (1) the presentation of risk 
information. Section B discusses (2) how to structure decisionmaking.  Section C 
turns to regulation of risk information both through judicial review and peer review 
by researchers.   
 
A.  Conveying Risk Information to Judges 
 
                                               
147 G.S. §15A- 534(d2)(1), (d3). 
148 At 34.  
149 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical 
Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 203 (2017).  
150 Stephanie Damon-Moore, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science Problem, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532 
(2017); Nat'l Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward 106 (2009) (“Review of reported judicial opinions reveals that, at least in criminal cases, 
forensic science evidence is not routinely scrutinized pursuant to the [applicable] standard of 
reliability”). 
151 Brandon L. Garrett and M. Chris Fabricant, The Myth of the Reliability Test, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1559 (2018).  
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As this section will describe, more research needs to be done on how most 
effectively to convey risk information to decisionmakers. One challenge in this regard 
is that decisionmakers may prefer information presented to them in categories rather 
than frequencies or probabilities, which then raises important policy questions 
regarding how risk categories are defined.  That problem suggests why the design of 
structured decisionmaking processes must be preceded by a more fundamentally  
transparent process: the regulation of risk assessment requires a set of rules designed 
to ensure public approval and ongoing review of risk assessment in criminal justice. 
An initial question is whether changing the way that risk information is 
conveyed can improve its use.  Social science scholarship studying how to 
communicate risk of recidivism in criminal justice has been the subject of decades of 
scholarship, but it is comparatively thin compared with studies on how to 
communicate assessment of risk for violent behavior in other legal contexts, such as 
involuntary civil commitment.152  That literature describes how it is not enough to 
simply provide information about risk.  That information, to be used effectively, must 
be presented in a way that overcomes misunderstandings about its meaning and 
emphasizes its relevance to the decisionmaking task at hand.153   
Even if valid risk information is being communicated, perceptions of risk can 
differ depending on the how risk is communicated.154  The format may matter, 
including how risk is framed.155  Not all decisionmakers are numerate and 
comfortable with quantitative information.156  Presenting information in the form of 
frequencies (20 out of  100 offenders), versus probabilities (20% of offenders), versus 
categorical terms  (such as “high risk”) can powerfully impact how well 
decisionmakers use the information.157  Judges and other decisionmakers in the 
criminal system tend to prefer categorical information, such as estimates of low, 
moderate, or high risk.  However, such categorization raises crucial questions 
                                               
152 N. Zoe Hilton, Nicholas Scurich and Leslie-Maaike Helmus, Communicating the Risk of Violent and 
Offending Behavior:  Review and Introduction to this Special Issue, 33 BEHAV. SCI LAW 1 (2015).  
153 Id. (summarizing literature).  
154 Varela, J. G., Boccaccini, M. T., Cuervo, V. A., Murrie, D. C., & Clark, J. W., Same Score, Different 
Message: Perceptions of Offender Risk Depend On Static-99R Risk Communication Format, 28 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 418 (2014). 
155 Hilton et al, supra at 3 (summarizing literature in the healthcare context).  
156 Id. at 3 (summarizing literature on numeracy or specifically “risk illiteracy”).  
157 Many studies have down how participants’ risk perception differs when risk is framed as a 
frequency versus a percentage.  See, e.g. id. at 3; Nicholas Scurich et al., Innumeracy and Unpacking: 
Bridging the Nomothetic/Idiographic Divide in Violence Risk Assessment, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 548, 
548 (2012); Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using 
Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2000); Leam A. Craig & Anthony Beech, Best Practice in Conducting Actuarial Risk 
Assessments with Adult Sexual Offenders, 15 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 193, 197 (2009); Nicholas Scurich, 
Richard S. John, The Effect of Framing Actuarial Risk Probabilities on Involuntary Civil Commitment 
Decisions, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83 (2011); N. Bodemer at al, Communicating Relative Risk 
Changes with Baseline Risk: Presentation Format and Numeracy, 34 Medical Decisionmaking 615 
(2014).  Additional research suggests that categorical presentations are still more effective, although 
they raise questions concerning the definitions and consequences of the categories set out.   
JUDGING RISK 
 
 
 
 
32 
regarding how categories should be defined.158  Decisions regarding thresholds to 
place individuals into risk categories should be made through a public regulatory 
process. In Virginia, for example, the categorization of “low risk” offenders to be 
recommended for “alternative sentences”  was made by a public agency through an 
open process. When private companies design risk assessment instruments, 
categorization is often neither public nor transparent.159 
Some jurisdictions have used visual models to display what risk information 
conveys and how to incorporate the information into decisions, and research shows 
that graphs can sometimes improve assessments of risk (although perhaps less so for 
less numerate people).160  A risk/detention matrix can display and convey the 
recommended structure of decisionmaking, rather than simply supply risk 
information and ask the decisionmaker to incorporate it in his or her judgment.  
However, research is currently inconclusive regarding whether conveying risk 
assessment using images—graphs, charts, or histograms—improves the effectiveness 
of decisionmaking in criminal justice contexts.161   
Studies have shown that like all decisionmakers, judges can be influenced by 
a range of factors,  including their political beliefs, desire for promotion, and 
consideration for reappointment or election.162  Particularly relevant to risk 
assessment of offenders is the concern that judges may not want to be perceived as 
“soft” in their sentencing practices, out of concern regarding reappointment and 
reelection; the recall of the judge in the Brock Turner case is a high profile example 
of the public scrutiny that can result from sentencing decisions.163   
Separate and apart from any career-oriented influence on behavior, there is 
research finding that judges, like all individuals, rely on shortcuts or heuristics when 
processing information.164  That suggests that judges may not give sufficient weight 
to statistical evidence that fails to confirm their prior beliefs.  Studies have found that 
judges ostensibly relying on a range of factors in setting bail, for example, often rely 
solely on prosecutor’s recommendations, rather than all of the other data that they 
receive.  Even judges who believe they rely on many types of information  in fact rely 
“almost exclusively on prosecutorial recommendation.”165 Studies have also found 
                                               
158 See, e.g. S.A. Evans and K.L. Salekin, Involuntary Civil Commitment: Communicating with the 
Court Regarding “Danger to Other,” 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 325 (2014) (finding in a survey of judges 
that judges gave the same weight to frequency-based and probabilistic presentations, but that 
categorical messages were viewed as more probative); Hilton et al, supra at 7-8. 
159 See Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, supra note xxx, at 60, 117. 
160 Hilton et al, supra at 3 (summarizing literature on use of graphs to communicate risk); ACLU NJ, 
NACDL, NJ Public Defenders, The New Jersey Pretrial Justice Manual, Dec., 2016, at 11.   
161 Hilton et al, supra at 6.  
162 For an excellent summary of the literature, see Jeffrey Rachlinski and Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging 
the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REV.  L. & SOC. SCI. 203 (2017),   
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troubling evidence that judges rely on an offender’s race when making decisions 
concerning sentencing. 166   
The approach taken by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing has been 
to convene focus groups of judges, district attorneys, public defenders, and probation 
officers, in order to create a survey and solicit evidence on what methods for 
communicating risk at sentencing might be effective.167  Not only may it create more 
legitimacy and accountability to involve a range of actors in the decisions whether 
and how to use risk assessment, but input may be useful  regarding how to present 
and incorporate risk information in decisionmaking. 
Whether attorneys are making presentations to the decisionmaker and 
advocating for the use of risk assessment information at the time that the decision is 
made may also make a difference.  In the pre-trial context, studies suggest that 
provision of counsel at hearings can powerfully affect release rates.168  Further 
research is needed on the role of counsel regarding risk-based decisionmaking. 
 
B.  Structured Decisionmaking and Risk Assessment 
 
 This Section focuses on how to structure decisionmaking to better make use of 
risk information.  Structured decisionmaking is defined simply as a formal or rule-
based procedure for making decisions.  Some states have incorporated risk 
assessment into decisionmaking frameworks, providing structured guidance on how 
to make use of risk assessment information.  Other jurisdictions, like Virginia, 
preserve fairly unfettered discretion of decisionmakers, regarding whether and how 
to make use of risk assessment information.  It may be that even requiring reasoned 
decisionmaking and providing for review and data collection on decisionmaking is not 
enough.  Efforts to incorporate quantitative information into decisionmaking may 
need to rethink the fundamental structure of that decisionmaking process.  The 
danger of structuring professional judgment is that the value judgements made may 
not be consistently or reliably reflective of the underlying risk information.169  The 
interface between risk information and the structure or categories recommended 
must be carefully assessed.  Fast-paced bail decisionmaking may need to be adapted 
to permit the time to make efficient use of risk assessment information.  Sentencing 
                                               
166 Id. at 221. 
167 Interim Report 8, Communicating Risk at Sentencing, Risk/Needs Assessment Project, 
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (2014).  The study, however, received responses from only 
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found that tables were more useful than graphs.  Id. at 12.  See also R. Barry Ruback et al, 
Communicating Risk Information at Sentencing in Pennsylvania, 80 Federal Probation 47 (September 
2016). 
168 American Council of Chief Defenders, Policy Statement on Fair and Effective Pretrial Justice 
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guidelines may need to be made more binding, and more user-friendly in their 
incorporation of risk assessment.  Substantial judicial education efforts may be 
needed.   
 
1. Presumptive Risk Assessment 
 
An alternative approach could simplify decisionmaking to make the use of risk 
assessment presumptive, rather than rely on traditional exercise of discretion by 
judges or other decisionmakers.  Studies suggest that providing a numerical “anchor” 
can affect judges’ risk assessments. 170 A sentencing recommendation that judges 
impose no jail or prison time to the lowest risk offenders might be far more salient 
than a notation that a person is a low-risk offender, without any guidance as to what 
alternative sentence is the appropriate one in that situation.   
Another approach would be to require the sentencing judge to state on the 
record a cogent reason whenever he or she disregards the sentence-lowering 
implications of a low-risk designation. Asking judges to give reasons in writing may 
result in more careful reasoning than an approach where a decision can be made 
quickly and without any reasoned justification.  The approach has its drawbacks, 
however. The Kentucky experience suggests that judges that are opposed to the risk-
based recommendation can readily offer cursory explanations for not using it.  That 
information, though, can influence policymakers.  State sentencing commissions 
could periodically review the “cogency” of these rationales from presumptive 
deference to empirical findings of low risk. 
Providing feedback to judges concerning their use of risk assessment may 
improve their performance.  It is difficult and uncommon for there to be a successful 
appeal of a pre-trial bail decision or a sentencing decision.  Judges are essentially 
unreviewed by appellate courts in settings in which risk assessments are made.  The 
same is typically the case in juvenile cases and for parole or probation decisions as 
well.  The only accountability may come in the form of election or reappointment by 
legislators or supervising administrators.  Moreover, judges and other criminal 
justice officials with large caseloads have strong incentives not to spend time on 
matters that they are unlikely to be asked to revisit ever again.  A real concern could 
arise regarding the way in which feedback could skew incentives.  Some jurisdictions 
have many more alternative sentencing and treatment options than others, and some 
judges could be penalized for not being in a high-resource jurisdiction in which risk-
based sentencing is more feasible.  Any effort to review and provide feedback to judges 
would have to take account of the options available to judges or other decisionmakers. 
 
2.  Automating the Use of Risk Assessment 
 
One approach that might reduce the perceived burden on judges or other 
decisionmakers would be to automate part of their work.  In Virginia, for example, 
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one development that might assist judges in applying the NVRA, and explaining 
reasons for not granting alternative sentences under the NVRA, is the adoption of 
the automated web-based Sentencing Worksheets and Interactive File Transfer 
(“SWIFT”) program, which has now been pilot-tested throughout the state.171  This 
program will allow for much more rapid recording of all types of information required 
at sentencing, including the Nonviolent Risk Assessment for eligible offenders.  Drop-
down menus could supply the most common reasons a judge might decline to impose 
an alternative intervention on an offender who scores as low risk (e.g., “I believe the 
offender’s risk is higher than indicated by the Nonviolent Risk Assessment,” “No 
appropriate community program to address this offender’s needs exists in this 
jurisdiction,” or “[This offender appears not to be responsive to treatment 
intervention.”  Automated systems can help to structure decisionmaking by setting 
out the order of decisions to be made and requiring entry of information to explain 
each decision.  
 
3. Needs and the Mitigation of Risk 
 
 In a range of settings, risk assessments may accompany needs assessments, 
e.g., mental health screenings, substance abuse screenings, educational assessments 
where the goal is not just to assess risk but also to mitigate it by providing 
rehabilitative interventions.172  For example, in juvenile justice decisionmaking, it is 
common for risk assessment to be considered alongside needs assessments of various 
types.173  Substance abuse screenings may be used to address whether a person could 
benefit from drug treatment.  When decisionmakers are evaluating not just future 
risk but also how to mitigate it through treatment and other rehabilitation, they will 
need to look at more than just risk assessments.  They must then have guidance on 
how to evaluate and incorporate information from very different sources---to examine 
not just risk, but needs. 
Risk assessment instruments are not designed to tell decisionmakers anything 
about whether an  alternative to punishment (or bail, or supervised probation)  might  
mitigate risk.  Indeed, risk factors on such instruments that are not causal are not 
directly relevant to the reduction of risk.174  For example, substance abuse is a causal 
risk factor for recidivism, a risk factor which often can be changed using a treatment 
                                               
171 Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, 2017) 
172 For an excellent overview of a wide range of screening and assessment instruments used in the 
area of co-occurring mental and substance abuse disorders, see Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA), Screening and Assessment of Co-Occurring Disorders in the 
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intervention, and if substance abuse is changed recidivism can be reduced.175 
Similarly, to reduce failure to appear in the pre-trial setting, messaging and 
reminders may reduce the risk of failure to appear.176 Other risk factors, such as a 
prior criminal history or age, are not changeable by any intervention.   
One challenge faced by judges and other decisionmakers is that they may face 
complex choices concerning both risks and needs and tradeoffs between the two.   For 
example, judges may be reluctant to divert a low risk offender from prison if no 
community program to address the offender’s is available in the court’s jurisdiction.  
Correspondingly, an offender assessed as at high risk of recidivism might benefit 
most from a community treatment program, but even if such community treatment 
were available, diverting that offender from prison to community treatment might 
well be precluded on public safety grounds..  As the National Center for State Courts 
evaluation of Virginia’s approach noted: 
 
One of the primary concerns of judges and probation officers is the difficulty 
many young males have qualifying for alternative punishment. Unemployed, 
unmarried, males under age 20 begin with a score of nine points [on the 
NVRA], and any additional points render them ineligible for a diversion 
recommendation. Judges and probation officers know that VCSC research 
shows this type of offender has a high rate of recidivism, but they also believe 
this is the group most in need of services.177 
 
We similarly found that Virginia judges often raised this concern in their survey 
responses.  In doing so, they were conflating risk assessment with needs assessment.  
The NVRA and other risk assessment tools can tell decisionmakers that an offender 
is low-risk and might be diverted from prison without endangering public safety.  
However, such instruments do not inform judges or probation officials or corrections 
officials which offenders might benefit the most from messaging, or drug treatment, 
or mental health treatment, or jobs programs.   
In regulating risk assessment, policymakers should separate the tasks that we 
are asking judges to perform: make a recommendation regarding incarceration, 
whether pretrial or as punishment for a conviction, but also make a separate 
recommendation concerning any treatment interventions.  When multiple sources of 
information are provided, it is all the more important that there be a structured 
decisionmaking process providing guidance on how to incorporate information from 
                                               
175 Id.  It is very difficult to identify such causal risk factors where many programs “are aimed at 
multiple factors at the same time” in a “blunderbuss fashion” that makes it difficult to conduct 
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more than one source.  Otherwise, risk assessment may be at odds with needs 
assessment. 
 
4.  Changing Institutional Incentives 
 
Criminal justice actors may not readily incorporate risk assessment, or any 
other guidance to inform their discretion, if it conflicts with their pre-existing 
incentives.  If judges have crushing dockets and very little time to consider pre-trial 
or sentence determinations, providing detailed quantitative information in a manner 
that would slow the process down will not likely succeed.   Realigning those incentives 
may involve incorporating new approaches into official guidelines, providing 
resources to free decisionmaking time to consider new data, and rewarding 
decisionmakers for their use of new data. 
Not just practical, professional, and reputational, but also financial incentives 
and resource constraints may strongly impact decisionmakers.  If judges or 
prosecutors are funded based on numbers of felony convictions, then alternative 
sentencing may reduce their institutional budgets.  If there are no resources for 
community treatment alternatives to prison, then judges will not be able to divert 
offenders to such programs.  Approaches to re-orient institutional incentives include 
adopting a “justice reinvestment” model to fund the diversion of low-risk offenders. 
In this legislative scheme, the fiscal benefits of reducing incarceration rates  are used 
to offset the costs of alternatives to incarceration (e.g., community-based mental 
health and substance abuse programs).  In California, for example, a “realignment” 
approach enacted in legislation designed to comply with court orders to reduce prison 
overcrowding, provides localities fiscal incentives to reduce jail incarceration rates.   
 
C.  Regulation of Risk Assessment  
 
 This Section focuses on regulation, through judicial review and through peer 
review, of risk assessment as used in practice.  Judicial review no longer seems so 
implausible an approach.  In a widely noted ruling that may prove influential in other 
jurisdictions, the Fifth Circuit largely affirmed a federal judge order that the cash 
bail system in Harris County, Texas, violates the Due Process Clause.178 The Fifth 
Circuit found a state-protected liberty interest in pretrial release and affirmed the 
judge’s findings that the system as administered was arbitrary.  The opinion 
emphasized that the judges departed from release recommendations by pre-trial 
services as much as 66% of the time and that when pre-trial services informed the 
court that a person as indigent, judges insistent on bail knowing full well that the 
result would be detention.179  What was also noteworthy, and consistent with our 
findings in Virginia, was that this pattern of behavior was not based on any written 
procedures, but rather an “unwritten custom and practice that was marred by gross 
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inefficiencies, did not achieve any individualized assessment in setting bail, and was 
incompetent to do so.”180  As a result, the Fifth Circuit described how bail had been 
imposed “almost automatically on indigent arrestees” without any meaningful 
consider of either risk or ability to pay.181    
However, the panel also emphasized that it would be unduly burdensome to 
require that judges provide written decisions explaining their reasons for denying 
release or bail.182  Moreover, that ruling, as noteworthy as it is as a constitutional 
ruling, did not provide a roadmap for the improvement of judicial decisionmaking 
using risk information.  Indeed, while it found the then-current system in Harris 
County to have been arbitrary, due to the rote insistence on cash bail for arrestees, 
the ruling at the same time encouraged individualized decisionmaking without any 
minimal accountability in the form of reason-giving.  Perhaps the new procedures 
that are developed on remand will put an end to a process that automatically imposed 
detention, through the use of cash bail, on indigent arrestees. However, the 
procedures that the Fifth Circuit focused on, such as providing written reasons may 
not be the best way to ensure consistency and reliability in judicial decisionmaking.  
If decisionmakers provide “individualized, case-specific reasons” but continue to 
automatically impose cash bail on indigent arrestees, then the result will be no 
remedy at all. 183    
We believe that the Due Process Clause demands some additional assurance 
of consistency and reliability above and beyond the minimal requirement that some 
individual decisionmaker consider, in theory, the relevant criteria, and state some 
reason for a decision.  Moreover, an entrenched, unwritten custom and practice may 
take more forceful an intervention to displace.  Additional language in the Fifth 
Circuit opinion, focusing on how in practice judges did not heed pre-trial services and 
did not apply informed criteria to their decisionmaking, supports our view. In the 
sections that follow, we discuss what should go into the design of a structure for 
judging risk and why they assist in assuring a non-arbitrary, constitutional, and 
sound risk assessment procedure.   
We would hope that future rulings on the constitutionality of the use of risk 
assessment take into account these features of procedures that should govern. In this 
Article, we provide a roadmap for: (1) presenting risk information in a more 
comprehensible way to decisionmakers; (2) structuring decisionmaking to better 
make use of that information; and (3) accompanying these reforms with ongoing 
monitoring, through judicial review and open peer review, of data to assess on-the-
ground use of risk assessment. 
 
                                               
180 Id. at 153. 
181 Id. at 159. 
182 Id. at 160 (“We decline to hold that the Constitution requires the County to produce 50,000 written 
opinions per year to satisfy due process.”).  The Court also relied on empirical analysis of outcomes in 
the county.  Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 
STAN. L. REV. 711, 786–87 (2017). 
183 Id. at 159. 
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1. Specifying Risk Assessment Criteria  
 
The Fifth Circuit analysis noted the deference due to criminal justice actors, 
in a due process analysis.  While liberty of arrestees, the court noted, is a very 
important interest, the court also noted that an efficient process stands to benefit 
arrestees, who desire prompt resolution of their cases. 184  As a result, the panel was 
reluctant to burden judges with reporting requirements, such as statements of 
written reasons.  The ruling is consistent with the larger practice in criminal justice. 
We note also that for risk assessment used by judges at sentencing, or by other 
decisionmakers, such as corrections officials or parole officials, the same liberty 
interest cannot be asserted.  The Due Process Clause provides for far less protection 
in those settings.185  We nevertheless hope that the framework and practices that we 
discuss here will be used in those settings, even if judicial review will be still more 
deferential than in the pre-trial setting.  
Criminal justice actors decisionmaking has typically lacked a practice of 
transparency and deliberation.186 Some jurisdictions have incorporated public 
discussion and input into their development of risk assessment instruments.187  Most 
jurisdictions have adopted risk assessment without setting out any such criteria and 
often without public discussion of what choices should be made. For example, Virginia 
did adopt risk assessment in sentencing in a statute, as described, and it specified 
that the lowest risk twenty-five percent of offenders should be given alternative 
sentences.  That statute did not specify how risk assessment should be conducted, 
however.  The Commission did make transparent the instrument selected for use in 
sentencing and sought input on its design.  Nor, in Virginia, is there a framework for 
judges to use when deciding how to incorporate risk into decisionmaking.  This is a 
contrast to the pre-trial instrument used in Virginia, the VPRAI, which is 
                                               
184 Id.  The Fifth Circuit also rejected abstention in the case, where no case-specific remedies were 
sought.   Id. at 156. 
185 Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) 
(finding no liberty interest in parole decisionmaking); see also Kimberty Thomas and Paul Reingold, 
From Grace to Grids, Due Process Protection for Parole, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213 (2017).  
186  Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1865 (2015); 
Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 91 (2016); Christopher 
Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583 (2018). 
Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent 
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 733, 743 (2000); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: 
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009).   
187 See Mesa County Evidence-Based Pretrial Implementation Guide, 2015 Innovations in Criminal 
Justice, at 6, 11, at http://www.apainc.org/wp-content/uploads/Mesa-County-Evidenced-Based-
Pretrial-Implementation-Guide-1.pdf.  
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accompanied by a PRAXIS, or a matrix that gives decisionmakers a guide as to how 
to incorporate risk assessment information into pre-trial decisions.188 
 
2. Independent Review and Validation 
 
The Fifth Circuit discussion, largely affirming the district court findings, did 
not discuss whether the pre-trial services data that judges had been considering or 
ignoring in their bail decisions, was accurate, and therefore, whether it was arbitrary 
for judges to be ignoring sound data.  The Fifth Circuit ruling emphasized the 
importance of individual decisions, not accurate decisions.  A due process analysis 
could instead emphasize the need for accurate decisionmaking.  Indeed, the district 
court decision in the case did discuss in admirable detail empirical research, including 
by independent academics, who had studied the bail process in Harris Country, 
Texas, and found that denial of bail had systematic harmful effects on outcomes in 
criminal cases.189  The district court also cited to studies showing that cash bail is not 
more effective than alternatives at assuring appearances pre-trial for misdemeanor 
arrestees.190 
When constructing remedies, such an analysis could similarly examine 
empirical data to inform new procedures.  The district court described how Harris 
County had agreed to use a new risk assessment tool, the PSA, to inform pre-trial 
decisionmaking, and was in the process of implementing this new risk-assessment-
based approach.191  Judicial review can help to ensure that the relevant 
decisionmakers validate their data and select instruments that are valid.  The review 
of risk assessment instruments has not always been public, or by researchers 
independent of those who developed the instrument.  If instruments are only 
validated in-house, or by the originators of the instrument, then the validations 
cannot be verified independently.  An additional concern, as described in Part I, with 
risk assessment use has been that the data, even if sound when the risk assessment 
instrument is adopted, may be out of date if criminal offending patterns change.  
Instruments should be re-validated over time, at reasonable intervals, and with 
attention to local variation in populations, resources, and crime patterns.192   
 
3. Monitoring Implementation in Practice  
 
                                               
188 Pretrial Services Agencies: Risk-Informed Pretrial Decisionmaking in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, November 10, 2016, at 
http://vscc.virginia.gov/Virginia%20Pretrial%20Services%20Presentation%2012-5-2016.pdf.  
189 O’Donnell v. Harris County, Texas, 251 F.Supp.3d 1052, 1106 (S.D. Tex 2017) (citing Heaton et al., 
supra note xxx).  
190 Id. at 1120-21. 
191 Id. at 1124-25. 
192 For extended criticism of “zombie predictions” relying on outdated data, see John Logan Koepke 
and David Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming, 2018).  
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 A behavioral component of any risk assessment strategy, focusing on how 
decisionmakers actually use risk information is essential.  The Fifth Circuit ruling, 
with its emphasis on custom and practice, and not just the criteria formally in place, 
was very helpful.  That ruling supports a due process analysis of how risk assessment 
is actually judged.  Indeed, the district judge noted that even once Harris County 
adopts a risk assessment approach, the concern remained that the risk assessment 
information provided by the PSA was only informative, and judges might ignore that 
information just like they had ignored 66 percent of the time, recommendations of 
pre-trial services. 193  Indeed, there is some evidence that in the first year of 
implementation of the risk assessment instrument, that it has not mapped on well to 
the bail schedule that judges use, failures to appear are still common, and some 
judges have “fallen back on their old ways, of trying to issue orders of preventive 
detention by setting money bail at an amount they know the person can't afford.”194 
A judicial remedy in this setting may require more ongoing supervision than 
the orders issued by the federal courts in Harris County, Texas.  Our findings suggest 
the need for ongoing study regarding how judges and other decisionmakers use risk 
assessment instruments in the various contexts in which they are asked to do so.195  
The same is true for other types of decisionmakers who use risk assessments, such as 
police or probation officers. In the juvenile justice setting, one study found that “there 
was a positive relationship between frequency of use and perceptions of value.”196  It 
may be that over time, judges and other decisionmakers become accustomed to and 
see value in using structured decisionmaking.  However, if decisionmakers widely 
vary in how they appreciate the value of risk assessment, then their decisions may 
become even more non-uniform over time. 
 In addition, as described above, the evidence from these re-evaluations must 
be incorporated into training and feedback that judges and other decisionmakers 
receive.  Just as judges receive guidance from sentencing guidelines and they know 
that departures from the guidelines will be reviewed more carefully or result in other 
types of scrutiny, judges should understand that poor use of risk assessment will 
                                               
193 O’Donnell v. Harris County, Texas, 251 F.Supp.3d at 1125. 
194 Megan Flynn, Harris County Bail Systems Offers Little Help to Defendants Who Most Need it, Cases 
Reveal, Houston Chronicle, January 22, 2018. 
195 See Koepke and Robinson, Danger Ahead, supra, at 52 (“By tracking concurrence, divergence, 
and why a judge diverged, policymakers may be able to create a positive feedback loop: The more 
that judges understand how a risk assessment tool works, and the more that the developers of a risk 
assessment tool understand how judges use — or don’t use — their tool, the better.”). See also Jodi L. 
Viljoen, Dana M. Cochrane, and Melissa R. Jonnson, Do Risk Assessment Tools Help Manage and 
Reduce Risk of Violence and Reoffending? A Systematic Review, 42 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 181 (2018): 
[R]ather than focusing exclusively on predictive validity studies and the development of new 
[risk assessment]  tools, researchers need to pay greater attention to how tools are applied to 
guide real-world decisions, such as by testing the pathways between risk assessment and 
risk management, identifying areas of slippage, and developing strategies to facilitate the 
ability of risk assessments to translate into better risk management efforts. Such initiatives 
are essential to ensuring that the potential value of risk assessment is more fully realized. 
Id. at 205. 
196 Shook and Sari, supra note xxx, at 1347.  
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similarly result in reversals or other types of scrutiny.  Unreviewed discretion will 
predictably result in poor outcomes.  Supplementing traditional exercise of discretion 
with risk assessment information will not itself lead to better outcomes, however.  
The use of risk assessment must actually limit and inform the discretion of judges, in 
a way in which they are accountable if they do not routinely take information on risk 
into account in their decisionmaking. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A central problem facing criminal justice today is that “appropriately reporting 
risk assessment results and commenting on its accuracy make little difference if the 
decision-makers do not understand the information, which is a serious possibility.”197 
In this Article, we have explored these challenges.  Just as judicial sentencing 
guidelines have been criticized not just for the content of the guidelines, but how 
judges have applied them over time, we must look carefully at how judges apply risk 
assessment instruments in their courtrooms, and how other decisionmakers such as 
probation officers and parole officers apply them as well.  Even if in theory, a risk 
assessment instrument can better sort offenders more and less in need of correctional 
supervision, in practice, officials may not use these instruments as intended.   
We find in two studies of the use of risk assessment in Virginia, and in 
surveying literature concerning risk assessment in other criminal justice settings and 
jurisdictions, that judges are not using risk assessments consistently, even in 
Virginia, long held out as a national model for the use of clear, validated, and 
legislatively authorized use of risk at sentencing.  Nor should that be a surprise, given 
that judges and other decisionmakers typically receive almost no training in risk 
assessment, and that there is no review of its use. 
The use of risk assessment in criminal justice should be regulated, with rules 
to inform and structure decisionmaking, and a process for developing those rules.  
The Due Process Clause and other constitutional criminal procedure sources do not 
provide sufficiently definitive or informative guidance in this new world in which risk, 
but also needs, are judged at each stage of the criminal process.  However, due process 
rulings could result in remedies that better structure and inform the risk assessment 
process.  We view the Fifth Circuit ruling regarding pre-trial decisionmaking in 
Harris County as a step in the right direction, but also a missed opportunity.  What 
was important about that ruling was emphasis on how judges do their work in 
practice.  What was missing was a plan for ongoing oversight over how judges 
incorporate validated risk and other information into their decisionmaking, and a 
procedural framework designed to ensure consistency and accuracy.  In Part IV, we 
set out a roadmap for how to better communicate risk assessment information to 
judges and other decisionmakers and how to improve the structure through which 
                                               
197 L. Maaike Helmus and Kelly M. Babchishin, Primer on Risk Assessment and the Statistics Used to 
Evaluate its Accuracy,  44 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 8-9 (2017). 
JUDGING RISK 
 
 
 
 
43 
risk assessment is considered, so that it can be used consistently and accurately in 
practice, to the degree intended by policymakers.  
Using risk assessment to reduce reliance on incarceration and improve 
criminal justice outcomes is a salutary goal.  As Richard Frase has argued, “with 
respect to low risk assessments, can we afford to renounce any major sources of 
mitigation, given our inflated American penalty scales and overbroad criminal 
laws?”198  Risk assessment could be used to dramatically reduce reliance on 
incarceration.  So far that promise has not been realized.  Unless policymakers 
examine and address the problem of judging risk-assessment by the decisionmakers 
tasked with using it, the risk revolution in criminal justice will not achieve its 
intended goals. 
                                               
198 Richard S. Frase, Recurring Policy Issues of Guidelines (and non-Guidelines) Sentencing: Risk 
Assessments, Criminal History Enhancements, and the Enforcement of Release Conditions, 26 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 145, 149 (2014). 
